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Abstract
Wardle, Madelyn. M.A., School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State
University, 2021. Offensive Cyber Operations: An Examination of Their Revolutionary
Capabilities

Since the cyber realm has become a prevalent area in society, states have been
developing ways to use this realm to their advantage. Popular literature asserts that cyber
attacks are equalizing, frequently-occurring events that make them “revolutionary” tools
of warfare; however, this study hypothesizes that cyber operations are not as
revolutionary as the literature asserts. This study examines the revolutionary capabilities
of offensive cyber operations by studying documented cases of state-sponsored offensive
cyber operations from 2005-2019. By utilizing statistical methods, first the paper
examines the documented cases and analyzes which states conduct most of these
operations. Then, the paper will use statistical methods to examine the trends in states
that have publicly documented instances of cyber operations versus those that do not.
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Chapter One
Introduction
On December 9, 2020, it was revealed that a top United States cybersecurity firm,
FireEye, had experienced a breach, likely perpetrated by a nation-state. Over the next
week, it became clear that Russian intelligence agencies had carried out the operation,
and it was much more far-reaching than originally realized. The IT management
company SolarWinds was the initial target and the path through which the Russian
hackers entered these systems, gaining access to United States government networks and
potentially thousands of other networks. To this day, the true effects and number of
targets are unknown, and investigators may never truly know the full scope of the
operation (Barrett, 2020). The following description of events and the scope is the most
current information on the offensive cyber operation, however, it is likely that more
information will continue to come out as time progresses.
The SolarWinds cyber operation likely began in March 2020, when hackers from
one of the Russian intelligence services compromised IT management software from
SolarWinds, an IT company. Russia used the hacked program to infiltrate at least 18,000
networks, belonging to a wide range of targets, including both government and private
sector targets (Sanger, 2021). The computer security firm FireEye was the first to raise
the alarm, when its own networks were penetrated as a result of the operation. The
government agencies that have been identified as targets of the operation so far include:
the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Institutes of
1

Health, the Pentagon, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and
the Department of Energy. To date, it seems that the hackers were only able to gain
access to the unclassified systems of these organizations, but the extent of the access and
damage is still unclear (Vaughan-Nichols, 2021).
The SolarWinds operation was extremely methodical and was an example of a
supply-chain operation. The original intrusion was into a system that SolarWinds uses to
put together updates to its Orion product, which is an IT management software that
allows organizations to keep an eye on what is happening on their networks. The hackers
inserted malicious code into an otherwise innocent software update, infecting the update
while it was still under assembly. Instead of trying to trick individuals into downloaded
infected malware onto their machines and systems, it packages the malware inside trusted
pieces of software. Therefore, the intruders could just rely on private companies and
government organizations to install the update with the malware on it at the prompting of
SolarWinds, who was not aware that the software was compromised. This operation was
carried out very methodically, allowing it to remain undetected for an extended period of
time (Hautala, 2021).
One of the most troubling aspects of the operation, besides the direct intrusion
onto government networks, was the compromising of the cyber security company,
FireEye`s, tools. These tools were used to find vulnerabilities in its clients` systems.
Some of these clients included government organizations and intelligence agencies.
FireEye uses its tools to conduct benign hacks of its clients` systems in order to discover
vulnerabilities and help fix holes in their cyber security systems. Therefore, the hackers
now have these tools that FireEye used to discover vulnerabilities, so Russia could now
2

have an advantage and has added these tools to its arsenal (Sanger, 2021). These tools
could be used against the United States in the future and will likely be taken into account
as vulnerabilities going forward. The implications of this operation are far reaching and
will be felt for years to come. This 2020 operation would be the most sophisticated
known theft of U.S. government data by Russia since a two-year spree from 2014-2015
(Sanger, 2021).
The SolarWinds operation, and even the hack against the Democratic National
Committee in 2016, were far from the beginning of Russia`s offensive cyber operations.
In April 2007, riots began breaking out on the streets of Estonia over the moving of a
Soviet World War II memorial statue known as the “Bronze Soldier” that the Estonian
government was moving from the center of Tallin to a military cemetery outside the city
center. Then on 27 April, the first wave of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
began against Estonian websites. The website of a newspaper, Postimees, that usually
received about eight to nine thousand comments a day received more than ten thousand
comments in ten minutes, which were all a variation of about thirty distinct messages.
Within an hour of the attacks beginning, the website began getting 100,000 comments in
ten minutes (Sciutto, 2019, pp. 21-25).
These attacks spread out across the private and public sectors, affecting
businesses, the media, the financial sector, and government websites and services. They
shut down the websites of all government ministries, two major banks, and several major
political parties. The parliamentary email server was also temporarily disabled, further
complicating the ability of the Estonian government to respond. The attacks were
primarily disruptive, affecting the operations of government communication channels and
3

caused interruptions to mobile networks and the emergency services lines. There was a
discernable effect for many people because they lost access to services (Haataja, 2017,
pp. 160-161) (Herzog, 2011, pp. 50-51).
The Estonian population was one of the most connected in the world at that time,
which left them more vulnerable than other states would have been. The DDoS assaults
cut off the access of Estonians from their news and government websites, making it
difficult to impossible for citizens to know what was happening. These disruptions
seriously impaired the daily operations of many organizations from small to large,
including banks, government departments, and small businesses. Estonian society was
very dependent on the internet and other technology, due to their structure. The economic
effect of these attacks has been estimated to be anywhere from 27 to 40 million U.S.
dollars, demonstrating a large effect (Haataja, 2017, pp. 160-161). The attacks have been
attributed to Russia, but only a single Estonian citizen was charged, and Estonia could not
retaliate, and struggled to deal with the attacks when they were happening (Sciutto, 2019,
pp. 23-25). These attacks demonstrated the potential damage that another country could
do to another only utilizing cyber tactics.
Over the last twenty years, as people, industries, and states have become
dependent on the cyber space, states and other groups have used this dependence to their
advantage. They have exploited others through cyber space by many techniques,
including data destruction, defacement, denial of service, doxing, espionage, financial
theft, and sabotage (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). The attacks against Estonia
demonstrated that large/strong states can use cyber operations against smaller/weaker
states, but cyber operations can be used by smaller/weaker states against larger/stronger
4

states as well. According to Sethi, “It`s difficult to name a country that does not
perpetrate cyber crimes these days to spy on countries and cement its political influence”
(Sethi, 2020, 196-197). While this statement may be true, it is difficult to say that all of
the techniques listed above should be considered an act of aggression. It especially could
not be said that all of these techniques could be considered a form or instigation of “cyber
war”.
Another aggressive form of cyber tactics is espionage, which can be used for
economic, technological, political, or military gain. China frequently uses espionage as a
tool against its opponents, including the United States. In July 2015, it was discovered
that Chinese hackers had targeted and successfully penetrated the United States
government`s Office of Personnel Management. Through these operations, China gained
access to the security clearance information of tens of thousands of United States
government employees. This data contained potentially damaging personal information
and could have been used to exploit government employees to the advantage of the
Chinese government. It was unclear what information was stolen or accessed, which
almost increases the potential for damage because it is unclear what China might be
planning to do with the data (Schmidt, 2015).
Iran has conducted many documented state-sponsored cyber operations on a
variety of targets from at least 2010 until the present. This has included several against
strong states, such as the United States. In 2019, Microsoft announced that hackers linked
to the Iranian government tried to infiltrate the email accounts of a U.S. presidential
campaign, current and former U.S. officials and journalists, and others (Sebenius, 2019).
Over an approximately thirty-day period between August and September, the hackers
5

“made more than 2,700 attempts to identify consumer email accounts belonging to
specific Microsoft customers and then attack 241 of these accounts” (Sebenius, 2019).
Microsoft did not officially announce which presidential campaign was targeted,
but inside sources told the New York Times that the campaign was President Trump`s.
This attack took place after the Trump administration announced additional sanctions
against Iran following the withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 nuclear deal
with Iran. These sanctions were intended to choke off the country`s oil revenue, and
Iranian officials have admitted that these sanctions helped plunge the Iranian economy
into a recession (Perlroth and Sanger, 2019). While it is unclear if the cyber operations
against presidential campaigns were a direct result of the increased sanctions, it is
possible that they were Iran`s attempt to respond. According the New York Times:
“The surge has led American officials to a stark conclusion: For Iran,
cyberespionage — with the power it gives the Iranians to jab at the United States
and its neighbors without provoking a military response — is becoming a tool to
seek the kind of influence that some hard-liners in Iran may have hoped its
nuclear program would eventually provide. While American officials doubt cyber
skills, or even the most advanced cyber weapons, will ever have that kind of
power, Iran’s cyber focus these days is notable” (Sanger and Perlroth, 2015).
This analysis was written in 2015, after it was discovered that Iranian hackers had
targeted the State Department of the United States.
In 2014, Sony Pictures was getting ready to release a new comedy, The Interview,
whose plot revolved around two actors trying to assassinate North Korean leader Kim
6

Jong-un. North Korea warned Sony not to release the film, and when Sony refused to
comply, North Korean agents hacked Sony. The hackers compromised at least 100
terabytes of data and released personal and confidential information online, including
email chains between executives. Sony eventually cancelled the release of the movie in
theaters but released it on online streaming services (Sethi, 2020, 160-182). This was a
state-sponsored operation against a private entity within another state that demonstrated
how states are affected by and will respond to offensive operations that target entities
within their borders.
States across a wide spectrum of military power, economic power, and levels of
democracy have conducted offensive cyber operations. These operations have been
against a wide range of other states, including both weaker states and stronger states
relative to the aggressor state. Have cyber tactics allowed weaker states to conduct
offensive operations against stronger states, and changed the balance of power in
conflict? In some cases, these tactics have been integrated into warfare, but are they
integral to modern warfare? Moreover, many states are capable of carrying out these
operations, but relatively few have been publicly documented as carrying out offensive
cyber operations, even less that qualify as actual “cyber attacks”, and none have been
documented conducting “cyber war”. The following chapters will attempt to answer these
questions and establish patterns to be able predict state behavior in the future.
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Chapter Two
Cyber Attacks: A Revolutionary Weapon of War?
In 2013, the chief of staff of Russia`s military, General Gerasimov, commented
on the potential effectiveness of “unconventional modes of warfare”: “The very ‘rules of
war’ have changed,” he wrote. “The role of non-military means of achieving political and
strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power . . . of
weapons in their effectiveness.”” (Sciutto, 2019, p. 13). Cyber operations have clearly
played a role in changing the rules of war, however, it has yet to be determined just how
effective they are. This paper will focus on state actors, because although non-state actors
act in the cyber realm, the most sophisticated capabilities still belong to states (Buchanan,
2016, p. 11).

Defining “Cyber”
The terms “cyber” and “cyberspace” have never been given a precise definition
on which experts and societies have reached a consensus. Many authors do not begin
their books or articles by defining the definition of cyber and cyberspace that they are
using. Publications about offensive cyber operations, including cyber wars and cyber
attacks, discuss the definitions of the terminology, though it would likely be more helpful
to break it down to the more basic level of defining cyber in order to ensure real
understanding of the terms. This implies that there is one set definition of the term “cyber
attack”, not necessarily even in just the expert community, but in the general world as
well, because materials intended for the general public do not discuss defining the term
8

explicitly either. This could lead to misconceptions about the realities of cyberspace and
its related issues, so the starting point for current purposes is a discussion of various
definitions of the term and a clear explanation of the definition to be used.
The book Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know by Singer
and Friedman is a foundational book on cybersecurity, that is written to be accessible for
people who do not work in the cyber field. They recognize and discuss that the definition
of cyber or cyberspace is complicated and stick with a simple definition for the purposes
of the book. They define cyberspace as the “realm of computer networks (and the users
behind them) in which information is stored, shared, and communicated online” (Singer
and Friedman, 2014, pp. 13). They also acknowledge that the cyberspace is not
completely virtual and involves the systems and infrastructures that allow it to work.
Clarke and Knake break it down even more simply, saying that cyberspace is simply all
of the computer networks in the world and everything they connect and control (Clarke
and Knake, 2010, pp. 70). These definitions are very straightforward and allow a broad
spectrum of things to fall under the umbrella of “cyber” and “cyberspace”.
Scholarly analyses intended for audiences already familiar with cyber issues, are
less likely to define “cyber”, but some do address the issue at a more complex level. For
example, Choucri and Clark (2018, p.3) state:
“In this book we view cyberspace as a global domain of human interaction that
(1) is created through the interconnections of billions of computers by a global
network, today the Internet; (2) is built as a layered construct where physical
elements enable a logical framework of interconnection; (3) permits the
processing, manipulation, exploitation, augmentation of information, and the
9

interaction of people and information; (4) is enabled by institutional
intermediation and organization; and (5) is characterized by decentralization and
interplay among actors, constituencies, and interests.”
This definition is much more specific than the first two examples but covers the same
basic ideas. Cyberspace has both physical and virtual components, that much is clear
from all of the definitions, both simplistic and complex. Cyberspace can involve the
internet, networks, and the physical systems infrastructure, that is clear from every
definition. This definition also makes the interplay among actors clear, which is an
important aspect for the current purpose. Therefore, the Choucri and Clark definition of
cyberspace will be used here, due to its comprehensive nature and specificity beyond the
very basic terms.

Defining Cyber Attacks
The popular literature in the field of cyber security asserts that cyber attacks are a
revolutionary tool for smaller/weaker states that will give them a level of equal power to
stronger states (Buchanan, 2020; Scuitto, 2019). However, not every offensive cyber
operation qualifies as a cyber attack in technical terms. Many scholars define every
operation as a cyber attack, but this is not the position of this paper. This section will
define cyber attacks to demonstrate what is discussed in scholarly literature, but this
paper will use the terminology “offensive cyber operations.” To begin, there must be a
solid definition of cyber attacks. According to McGavran, “Some 120 nations are using
the Internet to help fulfill their own “political, military, economic espionage” goals”
(McGavran, 2009, p. 260). McGavran`s article was written in 2009, so these numbers
10

have increased even more since then. The very term “cyber attack” is amorphous and is
used to describe everything from espionage to denial of service attacks, ranging from
attacks that are merely annoying to those that could have catastrophic consequences
(McGavran, 2009, p. 261). People use the term “cyber attack” to group all different types
of Internet-based attacks together, which can make the perception of the threat more
dangerous because states cannot address all cyber attacks in the same manner, and they
do not all have the same effect. As stated by Friedman and Singer, “Essentially, what
people too often do when discussing “cyberattacks” is bundle together a variety of like
and unlike activities, simply because they involve Internet-related technology” (Friedman
and Singer, 2014, p. 68).
There are many possible definitions of the term “cyber attack”. Friedman and
Singer do not provide a concrete definition but offer advice on how to recognize them.
They say that there are two ways to define what a cyber attack is. First, it must be
distinguished from traditional attacks, using a digital means or computer. This means that
a cyber attack is not constrained by the typical limits of traditional attacks. A cyber attack
can also be attacking multiple targets at one time. Second, a cyber attack differs from a
traditional attack due to its target(s). A cyber attack always targets another computer and
the information in it first. Even if the intended damage is physical, the attack will always
originate in the digital world (Friedman and Singer, 2014, pp. 68-69). McGavran argues
that “focusing on the primary intent of the cyber attacker is a workable way to deal with
interpretive problems posed by cyber attacks” (McGavran, 2009, p. 261). Due to the
theoretically low amount of resources needed to carry out a cyber attack, it could make

11

advanced cyber capabilities more possible for states that are typically seen as smaller or
weaker.
For the purposes of this analysis, the definition of cyberspace includes both the
virtual world, and the physical aspects that control and support it, therefore, a cyber
attack should be anything that attacks these components. However, the distinction made
by Friedman and Singer that the attacks need to target another computer and the
information in it, is an important one. Typically cyber attacks are virtually-based,
however some (such as Stuxnet, which will be discussed later), target the physical
computer system itself in order to manipulate the information within it. All attacks that
target computer systems and the information in them virtually and physically will be
included in this study.

Characterizing Types of Offensive Cyber Operations
As discussed, people use the term “cyber attack” to group all different types on
Internet-based operations together, which can make the threat more dangerous because
states cannot address all cyber operations in the same manner and they do not all have the
same effect. As stated by Friedman and Singer, “Essentially, what people too often do
when discussing “cyber attacks” is bundle together a variety of like and unlike activities,
simply because they involve Internet-related technology” (Friedman and Singer, 2014, p.
68). One of the first steps and keys to studying cyber issues and how they can be utilized
is defining some of the major concepts: cyber attack, cyber war, and cyber espionage.
The concept of cyber attacks was discussed in the section above, and will be explained
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further here and in the following sections. Cyber war and cyber espionage will be
explained in this section and the following sections.
Cyber attacks can also be distinguished from one another by using the three
factors that are known as the CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility, in
order to assess the goals of the attacks. For some, “the best way to categorize attacks is
by which of these three goals is being threatened” (Friedman and Singer, 2014, p. 70).
Confidentiality attacks involve attempts to gain access to the system in order to monitor
and gain access to the information on the systems and the users. Integrity attacks are
efforts to compromise and change the information in the system, not to remove it.
Accessibility attacks prevent access to networks, such as with denial of service attacks
(Friedman and Singer, 2014, pp. 70-71). All of these can be destructive, but they each
have distinct effects, so they need to be analyzed differently. In addition, all three types
of attacks help erode the faith of the public in cyber systems, causing more damage.
One type of cyber operation is cyber espionage, which falls under the
confidentiality part of the triad. It attempts to gain access to confidential information
using the internet. Cyber espionage is not just something that is done against states, but it
can be done against individuals as well. However, it is most commonly done against
states, industries, and government agencies. This is a unique form of espionage because
the perpetrator does not have to be within the borders of the country to carry it out,
limiting the legal authority that the targeted country has over the perpetrator even more.
Cyber espionage can also be done for economic reasons, attempting to gain an economic
edge. (Friedman and Singer, 2014, pp. 91-96; McGavran, 2009, p. 262). As Friedman and
Singer state “Cyber espionage is turning into a major political problem more due to the
13

accusations of intellectual property (IP) theft than political secret theft” (Friedman and
Singer, 2014, p. 95). Perpetrators of cyber espionage are even harder to catch because
they do not have to be in the country in order to carry out the attack, making it harder to
catch and charge a physical person with espionage.
Denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) operations are
forms of accessibility-based cyber operations. These attacks attempt to bring down a
website or service center by sending it too many data requests at once, so that the site
cannot respond to legitimate requests. These attacks hijack computers that were already
infected with a virus that allows hackers to control them. Hackers can control millions of
computers at one time for very little financial cost, increasing the effectiveness of their
attacks (McGavran, 2009, p. 262). North Korea launched denial-of-service attacks against
the United States in 2009 that affected anywhere from 60,000 to 160,000 computers,
using them to shut down various government agency and financial websites. Most of the
computers used were not located in North Korea, and many of the hijacked computers
were actually located with the United States (Kaplan, 2016, p. 213).
Two other types of cyber operations are called “logic bombs” and “Trojan horses”
A logic bomb does not affect the computer immediately, allowing it to spread to more
and to more devices before it is discovered. It does not activate until certain conditions
are met, then it becomes malicious. Trojan horse software tricks a computer into thinking
that it is harmless but gives control to a third party that can make it a botnet and take
control of the device. A Trojan horse was used by the Israeli government in 2007 to
infiltrate Syrian computers, penetrating them to examine Syrian air defenses. They did
not activate the virus until they were ready to put false images on the air defense monitors
14

to cover up their fighter planes flying into Syrian airspace to attack a Syrian target, the
Syrian military had no idea what was happening. This demonstrated how effective this
form of operation could be (Friedman and Singer, 2014, pp. 124-127; McGavran, 2009,
p. 263).
A popular form of cyber operation that is used to target both state actors and
individuals is phishing. Phishing attempts are generally conducted by emails that are sent
to try to get the recipient to click on something that downloads a virus to their device or
allow the attacker to gain access. Spear-phishing is a more targeted form of phishing,
generally using a form of social engineering to cater the email to the specific target to
make them more likely to click on it. This technique has proven so effective that about
two-thirds of cyber espionage operations use it. Whaling is a technique that targets a
high-ranking individual, such as the CEO of a company or a high-level government
official (Buchanan, 2016, pp. 37-38).
Zero-day vulnerabilities are a huge concern for companies and governments.
They are vulnerabilities that the company or government does not know about until they
are exploited. Most will not even realize they are being targeted until the attack happens.
As hard as they might try, companies and governments will never be able to find all of
the possible vulnerabilities, they just need to prepare as best they can and realize the
risks. There are some individuals and companies who work to find these vulnerabilities
and sell them, either to the companies themselves or to attackers (Harris, 2014, pp. 100104).

15

Cyber War
There is a significant amount of debate about what qualifies as cyber war. For
Clarke and Knake (2010, p.6), cyber war comprises “actions by a nation-state to penetrate
another nation`s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or
disruption.” Burton (2015, p.301), meanwhile, argues that it is the political nature of
cyber attacks that qualifies them as warfare. He also adds that since states have been
using cyber operations to aid military attacks and have militarized their capabilities, those
cyber operations count as cyber warfare (Ibid). By 2010, according to Clarke and Knake
some twenty or thirty states had already developed offensive cyber units, and that number
has grown exponentially since then (Clarke and Knake, 2010, p. 46).
Another perspective of the debate is that the term “cyber war” is conflated and
misnamed. Echevarria argues “What is commonly, and rather loosely, referred to as
cyber war is really a three-way competition between the rapid migration of essential data
and functions to online networks, which creates very attractive targets; the ongoing
efforts of cybersecurity systems, which struggle to protect those networks; and the
persistent attempts of cyber attackers, whether criminals or spies, who find ways to defeat
those security measures” (Echevarria II, 2017, p. 100). He also brings up the point that
since there are often no casualties and no physical damage, some people believe that it
cannot qualify as war (Echevarria II, 2017, p. 99). These points have merit. However,
most states view cyber tactics as a form of warfare and treat them as such, therefore they
should be considered in that light.
Some RAND analysts defined cyber war as “any means of warfare that shifts the
balance of knowledge in the attacker`s favor (Greenberg, 2019, p. 77). Author Andy
16

Greenberg emphasized a quote from a cyber security fellow at the Atlantic Council: “The
physics of cyberspace are wholly different from every other war domain” (Greenberg,
2019, p. 217). This highlights one of the most challenging aspects of dealing with cyber
warfare, which is that the lack of conformation to the physics of conventional warfare
indicates that the problem needs to be dealt with in a different way. Leaders and experts
from around the world have yet to agree on definitions of cyber attacks and cyber
warfare, which must be done before policies and responses can be formulated. Some
states have chosen to take advantage of this lack of a unified response from the world
community and the anonymity that can often accompany cyber warfare.
One of the biggest challenges in combatting and dealing with cyber warfare is the
difficulty of concretely attributing the attacks to a state, referred to by many in the
community as the “attribution problem”. While sometimes the attacks can be traced back
to the “command and control” servers that controlled the attack, their location in a certain
country does not automatically confirm that the attack was state-sponsored. World
leaders often want to know who committed the attack in order for retribution, but this is
often not possible. States often deny their involvement in cyber attacks even when attacks
can be concretely traced back to them, making the problem more difficult. However,
when states claim responsibility for cyber attacks, it signals their seriousness about the
issue at hand (Clarke, 2010, pp. 25, 213-215). The attribution problem makes it difficult
for states to retaliate, either in the cyber realm or militarily, or with other methods such as
diplomatic or economic sanctions.
Clarke and Knake explain some of the dilemmas experienced by states when it
comes to cyber warfare. They discuss the need to act first because of the pace that
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conflicts move in cyberspace. Strategy dictates that if a state does not act quickly or first,
they might not be able to act at all. The states that attack first can disable or significantly
weaken the ability of the state they are attacking to strike back. However, most of the
existing literature on strategy in cyber conflicts does not discuss the potential
disadvantages associated with striking first (Clarke and Knake, 2010, p. 45). These are
just a few of the problems states face associated with cyberspace.
This paper will not be looking at the issue of cyber warfare in depth, but
acknowledges that the concept of cyber warfare is important in modern warfare and
international relations. Offensive cyber operations and cyber attacks are a component of
cyber warfare, however this study will be looking at offensive cyber operations on more
of an individual operation basis, as opposed to looking at or for an overarching campaign
of coordinated attacks.

Defining “Revolutionary”
The term “revolutionary” can have many different meanings and connotations to
different people. In the United States, people often think of the Revolutionary War and
relate it to that. Merriam-Webster`s dictionary defines revolutionary as “constituting or
bringing about a major change”, and relates it back to the term revolution, which it
defines as “a sudden, radical, or complete change” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). This idea of
a major change is central to this paper.
In order for something to be considered revolutionary, it needs to bring about a
major change, a shift in the way things are done. This paper will focus on the concept of
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revolutionary in terms of tools of warfare, as will be discussed in the next section. The
potential revolutionary tool that will be discussed is the cyber realm, looking at how
cyberspace and cyber offensive cyber operations have or have not brought about change.

Revolutionary Military Technologies
This potential ability of weaker states to obtain an advanced capability to rival
that of stronger states could make offensive cyber operations (or cyber capabilities in
general) a revolution in military affairs. A revolutionary military technology is one that
changes the face of warfare and gives new advantages. As Davis explains, “revolutions
are not merely more clever technology” and they involve “dramatic breaks with the
existing status quo” (Davis, 1996, p. 44). This supports the idea that revolutionary
military technology must change the face of warfare while also changing the status quo.
Davis also states that when it comes to revolutionary military innovation:
“Technology alone is not sufficient to produce a military revolution; how military
organizations adapt and shape new technology, military systems, and operational
concepts is much more important.” (Davis, 1996, 47)
In order to change the status quo, the revolutionary technology must give power to states
that did not have as much power before.
There have been several revolutionary military technologies that have developed
over time, such as handguns, submarines, and nuclear weapons. Handguns were a
revolutionary technology because before their development, people had to be able to
physically beat their opponent through strength. With handguns, weak people were able
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to defeat stronger people because guns do not require the user to be stronger. Submarines
were revolutionary because they allowed military forces to move through the water
virtually undetected and made it more difficult for navies to attack each other. Nuclear
weapons were revolutionary because of their ability to kill large numbers of people and
cause widespread destruction with a single bomb/missile. This would give any state that
possessed these capabilities an advantage, no matter the size of the state.
Based on these examples, a technology should only be qualified as revolutionary
after it meets several qualifications. In all of the examples, the use of that technology
increased exponentially over time. Handguns spread throughout the world, and they are
very easy to find today. They have given weak actors an advantage over strong actors for
over a century. Submarines have become a common tool for any state with a naval force,
giving them the ability to move covertly. Nuclear weapons are highly coveted throughout
the world, and many countries are trying to develop that capability. Nuclear weapons
have also brought a new factor/level of deterrence that is considered in worldwide
conflict. They give any state that has them, no matter how weak, a bargaining tool. They
also add a certain level of protection for those states because other states are much less
likely to attack a state conventionally or with nuclear weapons if the state begin attacked
possesses nuclear weapons. Cyber tactics have spread through parts of the world, but they
are not as widespread as experts claim they should be. Some scholars claim that these
tactics could be used by any state with a computer, however this has not been seen in
practice.
Scholars argue that cyber capabilities could be an equalizing factor between weak
and strong states and offers a new realm of strategy for states. Unlike nuclear capabilities,
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cyber capabilities could potentially provide substantial regime security at a fraction of the
cost (Rustici, 2011, p. 36). The difference in cost makes cyber capabilities more
accessible and widespread, which adds to its revolutionary potential. This leads scholars
to compare cyber capabilities to nuclear capabilities, a revolutionary tool of warfare
(Ibid; Sharma, 2010).
While cyber and nuclear are very different technologies, it can be useful to
compare them in terms of their revolutionary potential. Sharma discusses this
phenomenon in a 2010 paper, explaining why cyber tactics should be considered a
revolution in military affairs. He argues that cyber tactics have the same strategic effect
as other revolutions in military affairs, such as artillery and nuclear weapons, in that they
have had a large strategic effect and have had an impact in creating a new world order
(Sharma, 2010, pp. 63-64). The effects of cyber warfare are potentially like nuclear
warfare, in that they can be far-reaching, devastating, and unmeasurable (Sharma, 2010,
p. 70). However, these capabilities have never been truly proven.
Cyber theory has had some of the same struggles as early nuclear theory as well.
Due to the lack of true cyber warfare events (and therefore, case studies), there is
uncertainty about what the potential destruction and effects could be (Rustici, 2011, p.
34). This ambiguity also lends to its revolutionary capability, because it has a strong
psychological effect of fear, as some have called it a “weapon of mass psychological
destruction” (Sethi, 2020, p. 5). While it may or may not turn out to be a weapon of mass
destruction in the traditional sense (physical destruction caused), the lack of warning
associated with cyber operations can add to the damage they cause (Rustici, 2011, p. 40).
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The uncertainty about the destructive capabilities of cyber operations means that they
might not have truly revolutionary effects.
Other scholars argue that cyber operations are not a completely revolutionary tool.
Valeriano, et al. argues that cyber campaigns are not as revolutionary or effective as
people claim when the evidence is evaluated (Valeriano, et al., 2018, p. 2). They argue
that “Cyber operations complement rather than replace traditional statecraft. We find that
cyber means serve as an additive foreign policy tool in modern strategic competition”
(Valeriano, et al., 2018, p. 3). This could be supported by the assertions of other scholars
that cyber operations are supplementary tools of statecraft, not methods that can stand on
their own.
Other scholars have argued that while cyber tactics might not be revolutionary,
they can be used as a force multiplier or coercive tool along with other methods. Cyber
capabilities have limited effectiveness as an independent tool of coercion and are only
part of a state`s “coercive toolkit” (Borghard and Lonergan, 2017, p. 453; Poznansky and
Perkoski, 2018, p. 402). However, not all cyber operations are attempts at coercion,
though they can have second-order effects of escalation in foreign policy (Whyte, 2020,
p. 213). Based on the current cyber capabilities of states, attrition, denial, and
decapitation strategies are the most likely to be effective in the cyber realm (Borghard
and Lonergan, 2017, p. 454).
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Cyber Use By Economically Disadvantaged States
Economically and technologically disadvantaged states still desire to have cyber
capabilities and have attempted to advance with the rest of the world, despite economic
status. As Kshetri states:
“Some analysts predicted that technologically backward states may face greater
challenges and difficulties to fight a cyber-war. Yet contrary to these stereotypes,
so called “rogue” and economically backward regimes have not been passive
observers of cyber-attacks and cyber-warfare. Indeed, quite the opposite, some
such nations have advanced cyber-warfare capabilities and potential to inflict
harm and damage to their adversaries” (Kshetri, 2016, p. 6).
In other words, many smaller states have realized the potential opportunities that lie in
the cyber realm, and how they can use them to their advantage, since they might not be
able to compete in conventional military terms. Cyber weapons have a wide range of
applications while also being exceedingly cheap, making the available destructive
capacity for weaker states “unprecedented” (Rustici, 2011, p. 34).
Scholars, especially in popular literature, argue both for and against the idea that
cyber operations will give weaker states the ability to attack stronger states. In some
cases, cyber warfare is referred to as hybrid warfare, and scholars have suggested that in
a world with one superpower, the rise of this type of capability was inevitable so that
declining and rising powers can challenge the single superpower (Sciutto, 2019, p. 16).
While these capabilities may have begun with stronger states, cyber capabilities spread
from great powers to weaker states (Buchanan, 2020, p. 316).
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“Cyber is a tailor-made instrument of power for North Korea. There`s a low cost
of entry, it`s largely asymmetrical, there`s some degree of anonymity and stealth
in its use. It can hold large swaths of nation-state infrastructure and private-sector
infrastructure at risk. It`s a source of income.” (Sethi, 2020, p. 163)
Sethi utilizes this quote from a National Security Agency official, which seems to support
the argument that cyber capabilities give weaker states an advantage. But it also
emphasizes the economic aspect of it for weaker states, which does not necessarily aid its
military power.

Cyber Strategy/Doctrine
Cyber tactics and doctrine hold promise for grand strategy in the opinion of
military and academic strategists. Some believe that a cyber war attack response should
include deterrence measures and escalation levels, with some, such as Colarik, comparing
it to the response that states would have to a conventional attack. This includes
attempting to make sure that opponents cannot form an opposition by impeding their
supply networks and means of communication. They assert that proportionality is still
key in responses to cyber operations in order to maintain the high ground and ensure that
the state`s strategic goals fit within a proportional response (Colarik and Janczewski,
2011, pp. 54-55). This idea of keeping the response to cyber operations proportionate to
the original attack brings up the question of what qualifies in that sense. If a cyber
operation is particularly destabilizing or overarching, does the target state have the right
to respond with conventional tactics? The answer to this question is outside the scope of
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this paper, however the question is important to consider when thinking about why or
why not states choose to carry out offensive cyber operations.
The early detection of cyber operations is crucial to combatting them and can
limit their damage. It can be difficult to go on a counteroffensive against the attackers to
strike back in self-defense (Osawa, 2017, p. 127). Osawa, for example, examines recent
cyber operations involving states from approximately 2007-2017, which show that cyber
operations typically follow incidents of international discord and/or conflict (Osawa,
2017, p. 113). This demonstrates that states use cyber operations as a strategy to deal with
international conflict aggressively, but without using conventional weapons. This can
communicate their message without firing an actual shot. Cyber methods can be used in
many ways related to warfare, including as cyber warfare itself, and this paper will
examine what drives states to use these methods.

Cyber Deterrence
There are many debates about the role of cyber operations in deterrence.
However, many scholars who argue that deterrence is difficult in the cyber realm do not
take into account that cyber operations are ultimately inseparable from the physical
domain. This gives cyber operations more geopolitical context and physical context,
where deterrence has proven effective time after time (Goodman, Will, 2010, p. 102).
According to Goodman, in order to have an effective cyber deterrent a state “must have at
least geopolitical symmetry with its adversary, if not a favorable asymmetry, to protect
itself as the conflict in cyberspace escalates and spills over into the physical domain”
(Goodman, Will, 2010, p. 109).
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This idea demonstrates that the cyber domain does not and cannot operate in a
vacuum separate from geopolitical factors in the physical world, one must impact the
other. An issue with deterrence being effective in the cyber realm is the attribution
problem, so in order for cyber deterrence to work, states must clearly communicate their
intentions and actions to other states in order for their actions in the cyber realm to be
considered deterrence. It would also be helpful for states to make their “red lines” clear,
in order for other states to know how to deter them effectively, knowing what lines are
acceptable to cross without prompting a conventional response (Goodman, Will, 2010, p.
129).

Cybersecurity Dilemma
The security dilemma is a long-standing idea and theory of international relations,
promoted by Robert Jervis (Jervis, 1978, p. 170). The basis of it is that as states secure
themselves, they inadvertently cause fear in other states (Buchanan, 2016, p. 3). This can
be said for many aspects of security, including building up conventional forces, creating a
missile defense system, and developing new technologies to increase the state`s
advantage in warfare. Cybersecurity and cyber tactics have not escaped this dilemma.
The cybersecurity dilemma can help explain the fear caused by network intrusions
between states. With conventional attacks, it is very obvious when states are preparing
for an attack, and the attacking state can expect a fight once it crosses the physical
borders of another state. However, with cyber operations, offensive forces can make their
way into the systems of another state undetected and the defending state is often unsure if
it will be able to fight off the offensive (Buchanan, 2016, pp. 4-5). The idea of zero-day
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vulnerabilities come into play here, because unlike with conventional, physical buildup, a
state does not know its vulnerabilities until they are exploited. This could cause any
network intrusion to be seen as very aggressive and potentially destabilizing.
States can choose to invest in either intrusion or security capabilities, or both, but
not all states choose to invest in both. Their choice to invest in one instead of the other or
one more than the other can be perceived in many different ways by other states. As with
traditional, conventional methods, cybersecurity methods intended to be defensive can
also be perceived as offensive, and the buildup of cyber defenses can be seen as
anticipating an imminent conflict. It can also be difficult to distinguish between states
infiltrating the networks of other states for espionage purposes or more attack/offensive
purposes, such as data destruction and military purposes. This could make states less
likely to engage in cyber action of any kind (Buchanan, 2016, pp. 188-189).

Economic Factors
The role of economics in this paper is to determine whether the level of economic
stability/success has a role in whether or not a state decides to utilize cyber warfare. This
paper recognizes that economics plays a crucial role in all areas of world affairs. While
cyber warfare is often seen as more cost-effective and low-cost, it is not immune from
economic constraints. Both the attacker and the target have the potential to suffer
economic consequences. Sometimes the intent of the attacker is to exact purely economic
consequences on the target. Network intrusions and intellectual property theft can cause
very real economic damage to companies, governments, and countries as a whole.
However, these types of attacks are generally not viewed to be enough to warrant a full27

scale response, especially not militarily. As Buchanan discusses, retaliatory economic
sanctions could be used, but they are often not effective tools, especially to combat cyber
actions (Buchanan, 2016, pp. 91, 184-185).
Countries with developing economies are more likely to suffer as a result of cyber
operations related to cyber crimes as opposed to more developed countries. They are also
likely to have citizens committing cyber crimes as well. These are often committed by
non-state actors such as organized crime organizations or terrorist groups, who often exist
in states who are cyber actors as well (Kshetri, 2010, p. 1057). However, the focus on
economics of this paper is on the point at which the state will engage in cyber warfare,
not how it is economically vulnerable or when it will resort to cyber crimes.

Military Factors
The importance of size and firepower for military might is obvious and has
withstood the test of time. With the development of cyber techniques, how the world
defines the strength of a state could be changing. However, it should be studied if
military strength is still a factor in whether or not states decide to engage in offensive
cyber operations. There have also been military branches developed for both offensive
and defensive purposes by governments around the world in order to engage with other
states in the cyber realm, such as Cyber Command in the United States (Clarke and
Knake, 2010, p. 46).
There is debate as to the relationship between war and the growth of technical
industries, and this could likely be said for the relationship between technical industries
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and cyber warfare as well. Ruttan discusses the idea within the context of the United
States that without the drive for military procurement, certain sectors may not develop as
quickly or robustly (Ruttan, 2006, p. 160). Due to the fact that societies are so dependent
on technology it is likely that the cyber industry would develop regardless. However, the
cyber warfare capabilities would likely not develop as well if there was not a militaristic
functionality. States will continue to develop their cyber warfare capabilities as long as
that potential is there.
Military experts agree that any war from now into the future will involve the use
of cyber power. However, they disagree about the point at which cyber aggression
becomes cyber war. Echevarria II says “We may define cyber power as the ability to
operate with relative security within cyberspace; cyber war or cyber warfare, in contrast,
generally means using digital “code” to inflict material or psychological harm on another
party, and thereby to coerce that party into doing what we want” (Echevarria II, 2017, p.
99). This distinction is important in order to understand how states will use these tactics
either separately or in conjunction with their military tactics.
Since the development of the first nuclear weapon in the 1940s, states have
coveted and closely guarded their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons will always play a
factor in world affairs and military strategy, and this paper will study if the possession or
lack of nuclear weapons plays a role in whether states will decide to use cyber operations
or cyber warfare. States fear that their arsenals are less secure now and that their weapons
and facilities are susceptible to cyber operations. States have done tests to determine their
vulnerabilities and have worked to fix them, but there will always be work to do (Harris,
2014, p. 140).
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Valeriano and Maness Study
Valeriano and Maness created a comprehensive data set that demonstrates that
cyber tactics are not as revolutionary as some scholars claim. They organized their data
set by dyads, and for each overall incident within a dyad they expanded the data along
many factors, including target type, severity, and damage type. One of the key factors of
the data set is the damage type section. They ranked the damage caused by cyber
attacks/cyber operations on a scale of 1-10 by type and severity of damage. This
demonstrated the lack of revolutionary cases to date because none of the cases had
damage scores larger than 4. Therefore, while cyber tactics can be used as acts of
aggression between states, they do not cause a large amount of damage, which is relevant
to any assessment of the revolutionary potential of cyber war (Valeriano and Maness,
2020).

Conclusion
Even though cyberspace has existed for public use for over two decades, there are
still significant knowledge gaps in its use and how it will grow in the future. As the data
set and evidence will show, state-sponsored offensive cyber operations have been
occurring since at least 2005 (that the public is aware of), but there is still very little
concrete knowledge about how they will be employed and the difficulty (or ease) of using
them. All of the components discussed (cyber space, offensive cyber operations,
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revolutionary military technology, cyber strategy, etc.) are integral to this study, and how
they will be integrated and used will be explained in more detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
Code Book

Purpose
This study examines whether offensive cyber operations are truly revolutionary
tools of warfare, or if they are simply a new technology, whose true level of utility is still
being realized. As discussed in the literature review, there is significant debate among
scholars in all areas concerning cyber, including whether or not it is a revolutionary
capability. Literature more designed for the masses, and non-practitioners in the field,
seems to overwhelmingly say that cyber operations are revolutionary tactics. However,
they do not necessarily offer more than anecdotal evidence and select cases to back up
these claims. This study analyzes different factors in two separate data sets to examine
the trends and offer more solid evidence for whether or not cyber operations are a
revolutionary military technology for states.
The purpose of this paper is to add to existing research on offensive cyber
operations, and which states choose to use them. The following section will use measures
of state strength to compare the states that are cyber aggressors to the states that are
targets of their cyber operations and the states that choose not to carry out cyber
operations. This will help determine if offensive cyber operations are a revolutionary tool
because if there are more stronger states conducting offensive cyber operations against
weaker states than weaker states against stronger states, then cyber methods might not be
as revolutionary as some of the literature asserts. Determining which states choose to
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utilize cyber operations and which states choose not to will also help demonstrate
whether they are revolutionary tools, because a truly revolutionary tool will be used by
states with a wide variety of levels of power.
In the Revolutionary Index Data Set, whether or not offensive cyber operations
are revolutionary will be determined by if there are more instances of weaker states
attacking stronger states, showing that cyber operations are an equalizing tool. This
would demonstrate that cyber operations allow weaker states to contend with stronger
states, which could help demonstrate that it is revolutionary if that occurs more frequently
than simply stronger states using it as another tool to control weaker states.
In the Revolutionary Capability Data Set, whether or not offensive cyber
operations are revolutionary will be determined by looking at the states that choose to
carry out cyber operations versus the states that do not. The metrics will help determine if
there are certain factors or certain levels of power (economic, military, etc) at which
states decide to carry out offensive cyber operations.

Scope and Limitations
There are a large number of cases of cyber operations perpetrated by and against
states, against individuals, groups, and states. There are hundreds of documented cases of
cyber operations that are public knowledge. It is important to recognize, however that
there are likely many more cases that the public is not aware of that could either support
the paper or give evidence against it. This is an accepted limitation of the paper, as states
do not want to admit their vulnerabilities, so this is unavoidable. There have also likely
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been many more attempts by states to conduct cyber operations against other states that
have not been successful, and were therefore not reported. If these attempts were
successful enough to be caught and recorded, they are included. However, there are many
attacks that do not make it past defenses and basic system security, that states and entities
do not have to deal with more in depth, since their systems catch them first.
Beyond merely the limitation of publicly available information about cyber
operations, the cases included in this paper might not be an exhaustive list of statesponsored cyber operations that are public knowledge. The cases of offensive cyber
operations that occurred were based on a specific source, and different organizations have
conflicting information. This paper uses a single, specific data source – the Council on
Foreign Relations Cyber Operations Tracker dataset – to limit the need to mediate
between datasets and accepts the limitations of sticking to that data set.
The dataset includes cases of state sponsored cyber operations against other states,
or entities within states. Cyber operations perpetrated by independent groups (not
affiliated with governments) or individuals, are outside the scope of this paper.
Independent groups are not constrained by the same factors as states; however, they also
do not necessarily have the power that states have either.
State power, especially relative state power, is very difficult to measure with
precision. Metrics based on a per capita measurement can be deceiving when it comes to
states that have large populations, such as China and India. Based on GDP per capita,
countries with large populations will rank lower, even if they are actually rich states with
vast resources, such as China. This could end up showing that Saudi Arabia or Sweden
are more powerful than China, which most people would agree is not accurate, however
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that is what the measure shows. This is an issue with all per capita measures, such as
military expenditure as well. That is why there are multiple different metrics being used
and this study does not depend solely on one to try to mitigate these issues.

Revolutionary Index Data Set
Data Sources and Justification
For the Revolutionary Index Data Set, the cases and factors examined will be
limited, therefore there will be few metrics used. In order to calculate a revolutionary
index score and compare the states that have documented cases of carrying out offensive
cyber operations, the states used as cases in the data set are all of the states in the Council
on Foreign Relations Cyber Operations Tracker. These nations have publicly documented
cases of conducting offensive cyber operations, providing a baseline for who is capable
of carrying out these kinds of attacks. All of the operations were attributed to these states,
not necessarily concretely proven. The range of years examined for this study was also
determined by the Cyber Operations Tracker, because it showed the first case of a state
vs. state offensive cyber operations occurring in 2005, so that could be used as a
reasonable baseline for when states became capable of carrying out these attacks.
This data set will be the one which examines the concept of revolutionary from
the perspective that a necessary condition for offensive cyber operations to be considered
revolutionary is that they should be used by weaker states to carry out attacks against
stronger states. Since there are many factors that go into determining the strength of a
state, and the main purpose of this study is not to determine state strength, this study
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utilized an already-established measure of state strength. The Correlates of War study has
been carried out several times in several variations over the years, and the results have
been widely respected for many years. This study will utilize the National Material
Capabilities score that gives a Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score
that was completed in 2012. This score is determined utilizing six different variables:
total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption,
military personnel, and military expenditure.
The total number of operations for each year and the total number of targets per
operation were also tracked for each state. These numbers are tracked in order to further
examine trends.

Methodology
For each operation, the CINC score of the aggressor state is listed, as are the
CINC scores for all of the target states of the operation. If the operation had more than
one target state, the CINC scores of all of the targets were averaged into a single average
CINC score for the targets. Then the CINC score of the aggressor was subtracted from
the CINC score of the target(s) to determine the Revolutionary Index Score for that
operation. If the Revolutionary Index Score is negative, then the aggressor was the
stronger state, operating against a weaker state(s). If the Revolutionary Index Score is
positive, then the aggressor state was the weaker state, operating against a stronger
state(s). This Revolutionary Index Score is one metric that will be used to determine
whether offensive cyber operations are revolutionary or not.
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Another more general metric related to the Revolutionary Index Score is a more
overarching perspective. It looks at all of the Revolutionary Index Scores for each state,
and then averages them to get an average revolutionary index score for each state, which
provides a more overarching view of the use of cyber operations by each state. This is a
metric that will help measure the data on a state by state basis, as opposed to being
broken down by individual operations for each state.

Revolutionary Capability Data Set
Data Sources and Justification
One of the difficulties with creating a Revolutionary Capabilities Data Set is
determining whether or not states are capable of carrying out an offensive cyber
operation, and the states that are capable would need to be included in the data set. There
is no perfect threshold to determine this capability that is not actual observations of states
carrying out the operations. The threshold that was established to decide whether states
should be considered capable of carrying out a cyber operation was based on data found
in the CIA World Factbook. If the listed military technology for the state was advanced
enough to require sophisticated technological capabilities to operate and maintain it, then
the state was included in the data set. The states that are listed as conducting offensive
cyber operations in the Revolutionary Index Data Set, taken from the Council on Foreign
Relations, are the states that are listed as conducting offensive cyber operations in this
data set as well. Each data point represents a state, with the variables being measured by
the most recent information for each state, and whether or not that state carried out an
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offensive cyber operation covered any operation it carried out through 2019. The list of
states utilized in this study are listed in a table in the appendix.
The basic metric that is measured is for the main baseline of the study is whether
or not the states carried out cyber operations. In order to put it in quantitative terms, the
state is given a score of one if the state conducted an offensive cyber operation against
another state. It is given a score of zero if it conducted no publicly documented offensive
cyber operations. There is no acknowledgment of cyber operations conducted
domestically in this data set because it is outside the scope of this study. This metric is
the dependent variable.
There are four independent variables. The measure of level of democracy of each
state comes from the Freedom House rating of the country from 2019. The state was
given a score of two if Freedom House rated it completely free, a score of one if it was
rated partly free, and a score of zero if it was rated not free. This will be used as a way to
determine if there are any trends in level of democracy between the states that conduct
cyber operations and those that do not.
A second independent variable is the GDP per capita of each state, to examine
any correlations in economic factors that determined whether or not a state chooses to
conduct an offensive cyber operation. The GDP per capita was measured in US dollars,
and the data from 2019 was used. Measuring the GDP per capita is an imperfect measure
of economic power because states with large populations might have low GDP per
capitas but still have a large amount of economic revenue and power. Any measures of
GDP and related economic measures have these imperfections, especially when
attempting to compare states with vastly different economic situations. There may or may
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not be an economic point at which states choose to conduct these operations, but this will
attempt to demonstrate whether or not there is.
The Composite Index of National Capabilities scores from 2012 explained in the
Revolutionary Index Data Set section will be utilized in this data set as well. These CINC
scores are used as a metric in this data set as an overall measure of state strength, to look
for correlations in that area. The military power of states is difficult to measure,
especially states that do not have extremely strong militaries and have similar strength to
other states. This paper will utilize the measurement of the percentage of GDP per capita
spent on the military in 2019 as a metric for measuring the strength of the military.

Methodology
This data set will be analyzed utilizing the statistical computer program R. The
independent variables are listed above: GDP per capita (economic power), Freedom
House score (level of democracy factors), CINC score (overarching state power), and
percentage of GDP spent of the military (military power). The dependent variable is
whether or not the state carried out an offensive cyber operation against another state.
Since the dependent variable is measured in 0s and 1s as explained above, the data will
be analyzed with a logit regression. First the variables will be vetted using the statistical
program to ensure they can be used. If there are issues with the variables, they may still
be able to be used because the spread of states is so large that there can be variation.
Omitted variable bias is a possibility in this data set, but the main overarching subject
areas have been covered. The field of study of offensive cyber operations is still forming
and growing, so there is not an existing field of literature to determine the relevant
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variables. Therefore, this study attempts to cover an overarching view of all of the areas
that could factor into the decision: economic power, military power, overall state power,
and the level of democracy.
Once the variables are vetted and considered acceptable, the logit regression will
be conducted. This regression will demonstrate which independent variables have the
strongest relationship to the dependent variable. The independent variables will all be
examined separately to determine if there is a relationship between them and the
dependent variables. Then all of the relationships between the independent variables and
the dependent variable will be compared against one another to determine which is the
strongest and the best fit.

Hypotheses
There are many potential outcomes with the four different variables in this data
set. The hypotheses of this paper are as follows:
H1: The higher the level of state power, the more likely that state is to carry out an
offensive cyber operation.
H2: The higher the level of military power a state has, the more likely that state is to
carry out an offensive cyber operation.
H3: The higher the level of economic power a state has, the more likely that state is to
carry out an offensive cyber operation.
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H4: The lower the level of democracy of a state, the more likely that state is to carry out
an offensive cyber operation.
The opposite of this hypotheses may be true as well, but before carry out the
statistical analysis, these are the hypotheses of this paper.
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Chapter Four
Revolutionary Index Data Set Results
After the Revolutionary Index Data Set was created and the calculations were
carried out, the data set was analyzed to determine the results. The main results are listed
in the following table and will be analyzed and discussed immediately following the
table. The more specific tables breaking down the scores and indexes for each state can
be found in the appendix.
Revolutionary Index Overall Results
State
Average Revolutionary
Index
Australia
0.032781
Canada
0.030924
China
-0.145177
France
0.023427
India
-0.040029
Indonesia
-0.007149
Iran
0.050532
Israel
0.009568
Lebanon
0.044187
Netherlands
0.035942
New Zealand
0.039217
North Korea
0.045054
Pakistan
0.062580
Russia
0.006260
South Korea
0.053549
Spain
0.011283
Syria
0.134512
Taiwan
0.178149
United Arab Emirates
0.000951
United Kingdom
0.012904
United States
-0.10663
Vietnam
0.071101
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In the final overall results of the data set, listed in the table above, there are
twenty-two states. Out of those twenty-two states, four of them had negative average
revolutionary indexes, while the other eighteen states had positive average revolutionary
indexes. Therefore, four of the states on average were conducting offensive operations
against states this study considers weaker than themselves, and the other eighteen on
average conducted operations against states this study considers are stronger than
themselves. This does not mean that every operation the state carried out was only
against stronger states or weaker states, only that overall, they conducted more operations
against states stronger than itself or were more significantly stronger than itself.
However, these results are much more nuanced and require a closer examination. First,
this section will walk through several example calculations for different states from the
data set. Then, the next section will examine the overall trends more closely, in order to
look through the nuances and attempt to determine what the data is truly showing. The
chapter will then examine several case studies from the data set to support the overall
trends. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of the results.

Example Calculations
The method for the revolutionary index calculations was explained in the previous
chapter. This section will go through examples of these calculations step-by-step,
demonstrating examples of individual revolutionary indexes and average revolutionary
indexes.
The first example will be an offensive operation conducted by Canada in 2019.
This operation was conducted against Russia, and targeted user accounts of Yandex,
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Russia`s search engine and email provider (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). This
was a one-to-one state operation, so it is a simple example. There was only one attack for
Canada in 2019 (and overall in the data set), and its Correlates of War CINC score is
0.009155. Russia`s CINC score is 0.040079. To calculate the revolutionary index score,
Canada`s CINC score was subtracted from Russia`s CINC score to demonstrate the
difference in power between the states. In this case, the calculation was 0.040079 –
0.009155 = 0.030924. This demonstrates that Russia is stronger than Canada, with a
difference in power of 0.030924. In this case, Canada was the weaker state conducting an
offensive operation against the stronger state of Russia, demonstrated by the positive
score.
China`s offensive cyber operation against India in 2013 provides an example of
the calculation of a stronger nation attacking a weaker state. This offensive operation
compromised the networks of India`s Defense Research and Development Organization
for the purposes of espionage (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). This was a one-onone state operation as well, however China targeted many states in 2013. China`s CINC
score is 0.218117. India`s CINC score is 0.080899. China`s score was subtracted from
India`s score, with a calculation of 0.080899 – 0.218117 = -0.137218. This demonstrates
that China is stronger than India, with a difference in power of 0.137218. The negative
score indicates that China was the stronger state, conducting an offensive operation
against the weaker state of India.
Many of the offensive operations conducted by various states targeted more than
one target, up to at least twenty-one in some reported cases. An example of how a multitarget incident is a Russian threat actor, Red October, that carried out an offensive
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operation that targeted governments, diplomatic missions, academics, and energy and
aerospace organizations around the world, and it affected fourteen target states. These
states were Belgium, Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, India, Iran, United States,
Greece, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Vietnam, and Italy. Russia`s CINC
score is 0.040079. To get a target CINC score, all of the CINC scores of the targets were
averaged together with a calculation of (0.002928 + 0.000637 + 0.008231 + 0.001984 +
0.003103 + 0.080899 + 0.015763 + 0.139333 + 0.002971 + 0.001406 + 0.002734 +
0.015239 + 0.008844 + 0.012848) / 14 = 0.021209. Russia`s CINC score was subtracted
from this average target score, with a resulting equation of 0.021209 – 0.040079 = 0.018870. This negative result demonstrates that Russia is stronger than its average target
of that operation. It does not mean that Russia is stronger than each of the targets
individually, simply stronger than the average target.

Revolutionary Index Overall Trends
The Revolutionary Index Data Set includes more states than are in the table at the
beginning of the chapter, but not all of them had cases to include because they only
carried out domestic offensive cyber operations, or they carried them out in 2020, which
was outside the scope of this study. This study covered a fifteen-year period, from 2005
to 2019. A full list of the states included in the data set, including whether their
revolutionary index scores were positive, negative, or if they do not have an index score
is listed below:
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State
Australia
Canada
China
Egypt
Ethiopia
France
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand

State Summary Table
Score
State
Positive
North Korea
Positive
Pakistan
Negative
Palestine
N/A
Panama
N/A
Russia
Positive
Saudi Arabia
N/A
South Korea
Negative
Spain
Negative
Syria
Positive
Taiwan
Positive
Turkey
N/A
Uganda
Positive
United Arab
Emirates
N/A
United Kingdom
N/A
United States
Positive
Uzbekistan
Positive
Vietnam

Score
Positive
Positive
N/A
N/A
Positive
N/A
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
N/A
N/A
Positive
Positive
Negative
N/A
Positive

To summarize, out of the thirty-four states on the list in the data set, four of the
states had negative revolutionary indexes, eighteen had positive revolutionary indexes,
and twelve do not have revolutionary indexes due to the lack of qualifying incidents.
There were three hundred operations recorded in the data set. When looking at the
breakdown of the individual incidents, 67.6% of the offensive operations had negative
revolutionary indexes, demonstrating that in 67.6% of the incidents in the data set, a
stronger state conducted an operation against a weaker state. The other 32.3% of
operations were conducted by a weaker state against a stronger state, therefore had a
positive revolutionary index score.
Of the eighteen states with positive revolutionary indexes, ten of the states were
only reported to have carried out one offensive operation (though not necessarily only
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one target state) over the fifteen-year period. Fifteen of the eighteen states conducted
seven or less offensive operations. Of the three out of eighteen states that carried out
more than seven offensive operations, their numbers of offensive operations were
significantly higher at twenty-seven, thirty-six, and seventy-five, belonging to North
Korea, Iran, and Russia respectively.
There were four states with negative revolutionary index scores, with a wide
range of number of operations carried out by each state, which range from one offensive
operation to one hundred eighteen operations. India and Indonesia each only carried out
one offensive operation (though not necessarily one target state), while the United States
carried out thirteen operations, and China carried out significantly more, at one hundred
eighteen operations. The high number of offensive operations carried out by China skews
the data set, but also demonstrates the conclusions of the data set, which will be discussed
in the next section.
There was also a wide variety of the number of targets of each operation. For the
three hundred offensive operations, there were eight hundred forty-two targets. This
comes out to an average of 2.8 targets per operation. Many operations only targeted one
state, however many also targeted more than one target state. The highest number of
targets recorded in one operation was twenty-one targets.

Revolutionary Index Case Studies
There were three hundred offensive operations carried out by twenty-two states.
This section will discuss some of the operations carried out, including some operations
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that were carried out by multiple states against one target state. These operations are
listed and counted separately in the data set to account for the different states that carried
them out, however they are the same operation and could be useful to discuss together.
Each of the examples will help demonstrate how the revolutionary index scores for that
incident contributed to the state`s average revolutionary index score.
In 2019 several states together conducted an offensive operation against Russia`s
search engine and email provider, Yandex. This operation was suspected to have been in
order to compromise and gain access to user accounts (Council on Foreign Relations,
2020). These states included Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. This operation was the only operation that several of the states were
reported to have carried out, including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Due to
Russia`s CINC score of 0.040079, this caused a result of a positive revolutionary score
for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom due to their CINC scores
of 0.007298, 0.009155, 0.000862, and 0.015277, respectively. Only the United States had
a negative revolutionary index score for this operation due to its CINC score of 0.139333.
China was the most prolific user of offensive cyber operations in the data set, as
well as the state with the highest CINC score. Therefore, any operation it carried out
resulted in a negative revolutionary index score, leading to the assumption that any
operation it carried out was against a (at least relatively) weaker state, including the
United States. An example of this is demonstrated by the compromise of the United
States government`s Office of Personnel Management in 2015. As a result of this
operation, China had access to the records and personal information of millions of United
States government employees (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). When China`s
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CINC score of 0.218117 is subtracted from the United States` score of 0.139333, the
result is a negative revolutionary index score of -0.078784. The United States is the state
with the closest CINC score to China, so this is the lowest difference in power between
China and another state and demonstrates the trend in how China`s offensive operations
will be scored and recorded.
France was only reported as carrying out one offensive operation, which was an
overarching operation carried out by its government against a wide range of target states
and industries. Its state targets included Syria, the Netherlands, the United States, Russia,
Spain, Iran, China, Germany, Algeria, Norway, Malaysia, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and Greece. The industries targeted by the operation included governments, private
industries, media organizations, military organizations, and humanitarian organizations
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). France has a CINC score of 0.014207, and the
average of its target states` CINC scores was 0.037634, giving the operation a positive
revolutionary index score of 0.023427. Although many of the target states were weaker
than France, due to the much larger CINC scores of mainly the United States and China,
the overall target CINC score came out to be higher than France`s, giving a positive
revolutionary index score.
India and Indonesia are the only two other states besides China and the United
States that have calculated negative revolutionary index scores. India is recorded as
having carried out one offensive cyber operation, against four states: the United States,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Although the United States is notably stronger than
India, the large difference in power between India and the other three states is large
enough that it resulted in an overall negative revolutionary index score. Pakistan,
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Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have CINC scores of 0.014554, 0.007469, and 0.002123,
much lower than India`s CINC score of 0.080899. This gave India an overall negative
revolutionary index, demonstrating that India conducted offensive operations against
weaker states more frequently than against stronger states. Indonesia only has one
recorded offensive operation, which was conducted against Australia. With Australia`s
CINC score of 0.007298 and Indonesia`s CINC score of 0.014447, it gives Indonesia a
negative revolutionary index score. While this one operation may not be significant, the
fact that the one operation was against a weaker state is significant, because it shows the
priorities for Indonesia. Its place as one of the four states with negative revolutionary
indexes is not insignificant.
Iran, North Korea, and Russia are the three states with positive revolutionary
indexes and high frequencies of operations. They all conducted operations against a wide
range of target states, and conducted both one-on-one operations, and operations against
many states, including both weaker and stronger states. The main target that helped cause
these states to have overall positive revolutionary index scores was that they each
conducted many operations against the United States, a state with a much higher CINC
score.
Israel has an overall average positive revolutionary index score, indicating that it
primarily conducts offensive operations against states stronger than itself. For example,
its operation against Iran in 2015 to gain information regarding the Iranian nuclear deal
discussions showed its use of offensive cyber operations against a stronger state. Israel
has a CINC score of 0.004250, while Iran has a CINC score of 0.015763, resulting in a
positive revolutionary index score.
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There are other states in the data set, however they fit within the patterns
described above, and do not require specific explanations. These examples have
demonstrated how the scores and strength determinations are made, and the next section
will discuss these scores and their meanings.

Discussion of Revolutionary Index Data Set Results
The results of the revolutionary index data set provide some trends, but overall
leads to more questions than answers. Despite this, it gives the study of offensive cyber
operations a starting point, and there are some conclusions that can be drawn from it. The
lack of publicly available information on offensive cyber operations will always cause
large gaps in the understanding of the subject. However, even if all of the information
was publicly available and there was a clear picture of the incidents occurring, there still
might not be a clear trend or predictable behavior. This paper aims to at least create a
starting point for understanding how offensive cyber operations have been used by states,
and how and by whom they will be used in the future.
As seen in the tables above, there are four states with negative revolutionary index
scores, and eighteen with positive revolutionary index scores. The four states with
negative revolutionary index scores are China, India, Indonesia, and the United States.
The eighteen states with positive revolutionary scores are Australia, Canada, France, Iran,
Israel, Lebanon, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South
Korea, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Vietnam. As
previously discussed, even though there are a much greater number of states that carried

51

out operations against states stronger than themselves, simply looking at that statistic is
misleading.
Out of the eighteen states with positive revolutionary indexes, only eight carried
out more than one offensive cyber operation over the fifteen-year period (though not
necessarily only one target state), and only three carried out more than seven offensive
cyber operations. North Korea conducted at least twenty-seven offensive cyber
operations, Iran carried out at least thirty-six, and Russia carried out at least seventy-five.
There are many potential reasons for the wide range of operations carried out by each
state, and some will be discussed when examining the second data set in the next chapter.

States With Positive Revolutionary Index Scores
The following subsections will discuss states that on average had positive
revolutionary index scores and examine possible trends. These states on average
conducted offensive operations against states considered stronger than them by the data
set, through the use of Correlates of War CINC scores. Since Iran, North Korea, and
Russia carried out the largest number of offensive cyber operations of those with positive
revolutionary index scores by far, they will each be examined individually. Then the
remaining states will be examined as groups, first the states that carried out more than
one offensive cyber operation, and then those that only carried out one recorded offensive
cyber operation.
North Korea
Out of the three positive score states with higher numbers of offensive operations,
North Korea had the lowest number at twenty-seven recorded incidents. North Korea`s
complete technological capabilities are unclear, but it is clearly capable of carrying out
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offensive cyber operations and has been since at least 2009. It has carried out a wide
range of operations against a wide range of targets. There are several possible reasons for
North Korea`s reliance on offensive cyber operations, and the choice of targets for these
operations.
North Korea will always be an outlier and difficult to categorize due to the
secrecy of the regime and its priorities. Though it is an economically poor state, North
Korea focuses its resources on its military, including its offensive cyber capabilities. It
conducts these offensive cyber operations in a variety of ways, including financial theft,
espionage, denial of service, and doxing. These operations are conducted against a wide
range of target states, ranging from economically and militarily weak states to major
world powers.
Over the past several years, North Korea has utilized hacking groups managed by
its intelligence services to rob banks around the world. They utilize these techniques for
financial gain, which could be part of their strategy to get around financial sanctions
imposed on them from states around the world, including the United States. The groups
have targeted financial institutions in a wide variety of states, from economically poor
nations with poor security for their financial institutions to rich states with robust
cybersecurity systems for their financial institutions. North Korea targets the financial
institutions of any state where it can find the opportunity and foresees significant
financial gain. Cyber tactics allow North Korea to carry out these operations more easily,
and they likely would not be able to carry out these operations without the cyber realm.
Otherwise, it would be much more logistically difficult to target physical institutions all
around the world.
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In 2014, North Korea carried out a doxing operation against Sony Pictures in the
United States, in response to their film The Interview, about two reporters attempting to
assassinate Kim Jong-Un (Sethi, 2020, 160-182). This was a political statement, and an
aggressive action that North Korea was able to get away with due to its nature. The
release of the film was greatly subdued, and though it was still released, North Korea was
effectively able to censor the release of a movie in a democratic country. There were few,
if any, consequences to this operation for North Korea. This was a demonstration of
North Korean power against a stronger state (the United States) that resulted in a positive
revolutionary index score.
Many of North Korea`s offensive cyber operations have been carried out against
the United States, which helped ensure that it ended with a positive revolutionary index
score since the difference in power and CINC score is so great. This demonstrates how
cyber methods enabled a weaker state that aspires to be powerful to carry out operations
against a major world power with few consequences. North Korea has used denial of
service and doxing operations to get its political message across, as well as espionage in
order to gain access to the information of private industries and government entities in the
United States. While the United States has been the main major power target of North
Korea`s cyber operations, China and Russia have been targeted several times as well. The
United States is likely targeted much more frequently because it is much more of an
adversary of North Korea. These operations allow it to carry out offensive action against
any major powers; however, the gains these operations give North Korea are small. North
Korea has never attempted (at least not based on publicly available information) to
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initiate or carry out anything resembling cyber war. This indicates that cyber operations
might be useful offensively, but they have not completely changed the face of warfare.
Although North Korea`s cyber operations have targeted a wide range of states,
most of the operations targeted the United States, South Korea, and other regional rivals
in Asia. Its consistent targeting of South Korea also helped lead to its average positive
revolutionary index score, since North Korea has a CINC score of 0.013260, and South
Korea has a CINC score of 0.023212. Targeting South Korea and other regional rivals in
Asia helps support the idea of cyber capabilities being a regional tool that can help states
gain power over other peer competitors that are geographically close. North Korea cannot
physically attack South Korea, and likely has some difficulty crossing the border to
commit espionage physically. Therefore, cyber operations are likely a useful tool to
conduct offensive operations against a neighboring rival and gain useful information to
use against them.
North Korea is a nuclear power with several missile options, with strong
intentions to develop more. This capability makes them a threat to stronger states;
however, they likely only have a small number of nuclear-capable missiles with usable
ranges. North Korea likely not only utilizes offensive cyber operations for financial gain
and espionage, but also to force major world powers to see them as a threat, a force to be
taken seriously. Though their cyber operations have caused some financial and data
losses, these operations have been more of a “nuisance” than causing true damage. Cyber
operations have allowed North Korea to “poke” major powers and remind them of North
Korea`s power aspirations without forcing the stronger states to respond or conduct
operations in response. Due to the lack of true, lasting damage caused by these cyber
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operations, and the lack of evidence that North Korea could carry out extremely
sophisticated, disabling operations on a target state-wide or even government-wide, there
has been no indication that North Korea`s cyber capabilities could carry out an equalizing
operation against a stronger state.
Though North Korea has carried out offensive cyber operations against the United
States, they were either for the purposes of espionage or to send a political message,
which generally resulted in more of a nuisance than destruction. This does not speak to
cyber tactics being a revolutionary tool of warfare, because it has not given it relatively
equal standing to a major power such as the United States, Russia, or China. Cyber
capabilities might progress further to make this true, but they are not to that point yet.
Iran
Iran has been conducting offensive cyber operations since at least 2010, against a
wide variety of target states around the world. Out of the three states with positive
revolutionary index scores and high numbers of operations, Iran conducted the second
most offensive cyber operations at thirty-six. There are many potential reasons for this
trend, and the motivations are likely similar to those of North Korea. As more of a
medium power in the world, Iran does not have the physical capabilities to target major
world powers conventionally. It also has many regional rivals, which they likely could
not attack conventionally without sparking a larger conflict.
While Iran might not be a major power in the world, it is a relatively major power
in the Middle East, with many rival states in the region. One rival state that Iran has
targeted with its offensive cyber operations is Bahrain. Bahrain was included in several of
Iran`s operations that targeted many states at once, as well as targeted Bahrain directly in
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deliberate efforts against the state. In 2019, threat actors attributed to Iran targeted
Bahrain`s National Security Agency, Ministry of Interior, and the office of the first
deputy prime minister (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). In 2020, an Iranian statebacked group installed malware on the network of Bahrain`s national oil producer
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). Although the 2020 operation is not included in the
data set, it is worth noting since it demonstrates a pattern. While these operations were
detected, it is unclear how much information Iran gained as a result. Iran has used
offensive cyber operations to gain advantages over regional rivals, including both weaker
rivals and stronger rivals.
Another frequent target of Iran`s cyber operations is Saudi Arabia, a major
regional rival. Saudi Arabia is considered stronger than Iran, and Iran has utilized cyber
operations to carry out offensive operations without prompting a conventional response
from Saudi Arabia. Iran has carried out many cyber operations against Saudi Arabia since
2010, and one of the most notable was in 2012, when threat actors attributed to Iran
wiped data from approximately 35,000 computers belonging to the Saudi state-owned oil
company Aramco, one of the world`s largest oil companies (Council on Foreign
Relations, 2020). This was a clearly offensive operation that destroyed data, which would
have likely prompted a military response if the computers had been physically destroyed,
but since there had been no physical intrusions, Saudi Arabia`s response appeared to only
be denouncement. Cyber operations have allowed Iran to conduct operations against
Saudi Arabia, a major regional rival, that have been damaging, as well as espionage, with
few public consequences, though this does not mean there were no consequences over all.
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There have been a number of cases of Iran conducting offensive cyber operations
against multiple states at a time, and in many cases, against groups of states in the Middle
East. These cyber operations can be seen as aiding Iran`s place in the Middle East as a
powerful actor, one that must be considered when acting in the region. It could help keep
Iran in front of those states in the region that have not yet developed cyber capabilities. It
could also help Iran compete with regional rivals that are more at the peer level, such as
Saudi Arabia and Israel. These cyber operations have allowed Iran to conduct offensive
operations to attempt to increase its power without firing a shot, and without prompting a
response from the other states.
Although Iran has been working on developing nuclear capabilities for many
years now, it has not been successful, so it does not have nuclear capabilities to rely on to
be taken seriously by the major world powers as North Korea does. While Iran is working
to develop nuclear capabilities and improve its conventional capabilities, its cyber
capabilities are likely helping its position against the major powers, but these capabilities
are not equalizing. Iran has not conducted any offensive cyber operations that would
qualify as cyber war, and no truly disabling operations against major powers. They
operations have also been conducted without consequences. It has conducted cyber
espionage against major powers that might have yielded useful information; however,
none of the cyber operations were truly destructive against a major power such as the
United States, China, or Russia.
Iran`s use of offensive cyber operations against major powers could lead to the
assertion that these are revolutionary tools of warfare. These operations do demonstrate
the standing and abilities that they can give a medium-sized power. However, to date they
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have not proven to be an equalizing factor. Iran`s station in the world power order has not
risen past a medium power, and they have not carried out any true, destructive cyber
attacks against a major power. Cyber tactics have allowed Iran to carry out espionage
more deeply than it might have otherwise, but these operations indicate that cyber tactics
are simply a new way to carry out espionage.
Russia
Russia was once one of the two great powers in the world, in constant competition
with the United States throughout the Cold War for power. Out of all of the states with
average positive revolutionary index scores, Russia had the highest number of offensive
cyber operations, at seventy-five. Russia has the highest CINC score out of all of the
states with positive revolutionary index scores, so it is unsurprising that it was the most
aggressive. It carried out operations against a wide range of states, and many of its
offensive cyber operations were carried out against the United States, which solidified its
positive revolutionary index score since the United States has a higher CINC score than
Russia. However, Russia also carried out destructive operations against weaker states,
such as Estonia and Georgia.
As discussed in the introduction, in 2007 actors attributed to Russia carried out a
distributed-denial-of-service operation against Estonia. This operation lasted for days,
disrupting access to Estonian services from both private and public entities, including
government services. These denial-of-service attacks are estimated to have had an
economic impact of twenty-seven to forty million US dollars (Haataja, 2017, pp. 160161). This was not a physically destructive operation, but it was very disruptive and had a
great economic impact. Though Russia on average conducted operations with positive
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revolutionary index scores, this operation resulted in a negative revolutionary index score
because Russia is much stronger than Estonia. This is significant because although Russia
generally targets stronger states with its offensive cyber operations, one of its most
damaging operations was against a much weaker state.
Another example of a Russian offensive operation against a weaker state was one
of the first examples of offensive cyber operations potentially being used to coincide with
offensive operations in a conventional war. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, but not
before conducting denial-of-service attacks that disabled Georgian websites and put out
pro-Russian propaganda before the invasion (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
Though these operations were conducted, they likely did not have a large impact on the
outcome of the war itself. This is a significant example because it demonstrated that
cyber operations could be used together with conventional tactics in a wartime situation,
but they were still not truly utilized or fully integrated. This could have been considered
cyber warfare in some respects, but the publicly known damage was so superficial and
relatively insignificant that it does not meet that threshold, though the operations do
qualify as cyber attacks. Another reason for its significance is that this is another of
Russia`s most significant operations, but it was once again carried out against a
significantly weaker state. This also supports the idea that the most damaging nonespionage operations are generally carried out against weaker states.
In contrast to significant operations against weaker states, Russia has also carried
out a number of operations against stronger states, predominantly the United States.
These operations have been carried out against a wide range of entities in the United
States, private sector, universities, public sector, the government, and the military.
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Several of these operations were carried out against the Democratic National Committee,
directly against the committee and against the Democratic National Convention. Most
operations conducted by Russia against the United States are for the purposes of
espionage, and these operations are the reason that Russia ended up with a positive
revolutionary index score.
Though the operations by Russia against the United States could lead to the
assumption that offensive cyber operations are a revolutionary tool, this needs to be
examined more closely. The operations against Estonia and Georgia demonstrate that at
the very least there is potential for disruptive use of cyber tactics in warfare, possibly
even destructive uses for cyber tactics in warfare. However, these tactics have only been
partially utilized, and only against weaker states. When conducting operations against
stronger states or other major powers, cyber operations seem to merely be used as another
tool of espionage. While this could potentially be seen as a revolution in tools of
espionage, this indicates that it might not be a revolutionary tool of warfare itself at this
point.
Despite the fact that Russia`s cases of offensive cyber operations might not meet
the qualifications to be considered a revolutionary tool of warfare, these operations have
allowed Russia to continue to assert its status as a threat and a major power in the world.
Cyber operations are more difficult to concretely prove attribution, and Russia has been
able to use this aspect to conduct operations while claiming innocence and prevent
retaliation. Russia has nuclear weapons that could be considered a threat to almost any
nation worldwide; however, it is unlikely that these weapons will be used in conflicts due

61

to their major escalatory effect. Russia`s ability to carry out cyber operations allows it to
be a clear and present threat to major powers and other states around the world.
Overall Trends of Positive Scores With High Numbers of Offensive Cyber Operations
The three states with the highest numbers of offensive cyber operations were all
within the top seven CINC scores of the eighteen positive score states. Russia had the
highest CINC score, Iran had the third highest, and North Korea had the seventh highest.
These states were already relatively “strong” states and had some sort of standing and
military power. Russia and Iran clearly fit this model; however North Korea is somewhat
an outlier.
North Korea is economically weak, and its only military standing essentially
comes from its nuclear weapons capabilities. Iran lacks nuclear capabilities; however, its
conventional military capabilities and its progression towards nuclear capabilities give it
military standing. Russia`s status as a major world power is clear, though it is not the
world power that it was thirty to forty years ago. Cyber capabilities might help these
states keep their current status, or remain a threat to stronger world powers, but it has not
given these states an equalizing power.
All three of these states have heavily used cyber operations for the purposes of
espionage. This leads to the idea that cyber tactics might be a revolution in espionage
tactics, even if they have not yet crossed the threshold to be considered revolutionary
tools of warfare. They have allowed states to conduct espionage against states and gain
information from them without stepping foot in the country in many cases. This requires
less resources from the states, and potentially less consequences if they are caught,
because the attribution problem allows for deniability.
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North Korea and Iran focused many of the offensive cyber efforts against regional
rivals, both stronger and weaker than themselves. Offensive cyber operations could allow
states to maintain their regional superiority, or at least preserve their sovereignty against
potential regional threats. It could also potentially allow states to try to undermine their
rivals without their knowledge. Russia targeted some states in Europe and along its
borders as well. With the exception of the consistent targeting of the United States by
these three states, they mostly focused on regional threats, which could take away from
the potential truly revolutionary capabilities of cyber operations.
The consistent targeting of the United States could be seen as evidence that
offensive cyber operations are revolutionary tactics, but not necessarily revolutionary
tools of warfare. Cyber operations have allowed weaker states to target the United States,
which is a shift from before cyber operations, when states had to carry out physical
damage or infiltrate a state in order to target that state. Cyber tactics have allowed states
from around the world to target the United States without setting foot in the country.
However, these tactics still have not truly undermined the power of the United States or
caused a shift in power, nor have they been used as an actual form of warfare against the
United States. Cyber operations may be used as a major tool of warfare in the future, or
they may become advanced enough to control the infrastructure and systems of a state,
but they are not to that point yet, therefore they should not yet be considered a revolution
in military affairs.
States With More Than One Offensive Cyber Operation
There are five states in the data set with a positive revolutionary index score on
average that have carried out more than one offensive cyber operation, but less than ten
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offensive cyber operations: Israel, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom, and Vietnam. Though they carried out few operations, on average these states
carried out operations against stronger states.
Most of Israel`s offensive cyber operations were conducted against regional
rivals. The most frequent target of Israel`s offensive operations was Iran, a state with a
stronger CINC score than Israel. Both Israel and Iran are middle powers, though at
differing levels. These operations have allowed Israel to challenge Iran`s power in the
region, and several of these operations have targeted Iran`s nuclear program. Israel`s
operations support the idea that offensive cyber operations are useful against regional
targets, as well as states at a similar power level. Israel`s participation in the Stuxnet
operation against Iran (which will be discussed in more detail in the United States
section) could be considered revolutionary, but it was carried out with a state stronger
than Iran, so that could take away some of the revolutionary factor. If Israel is able to use
these operations to gain power going forward, then that could help indicate that the
tactics are revolutionary.
The main target of Pakistan`s offensive cyber operations have been regional
actors, especially India. India has a much higher CINC score than Pakistan, so this
difference was a major factor in Pakistan`s revolutionary index score. Pakistan and India
have been significant rivals for a long period of time, and cyber operations are another
way that they can target one another. Cyber operations could be seen as a revolutionary
tool of warfare in this conflict because they can inflict damage against one another
without firing a shot, which could take the conflict to a new arena. This helps emphasize
the regional conflict potential of offensive cyber operations, and the India/Pakistan
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conflict will likely be an interesting area to watch going forward to see how and if it
incorporates cyber operations.
The United Arab Emirates has exclusively conducted offensive cyber operations
against regional rivals: Qatar, Turkey, and Yemen. Though the United Arab Emirates is
rated as stronger than Qatar and Yemen, the power and score differential between the
United Arab Emirates and Turkey is enough to sway its average revolutionary index
score in the positive direction. The variation in conducting operations against both
stronger and weaker states, but all of the targets are regional rivals is significant and
demonstrates the purpose for which cyber operations are currently used by that state. This
use of cyber operations is not changing the balance of power in the region, leading to the
conclusion that the example of the United Arab Emirates does not support the idea that
cyber operations cause a revolution in military affairs.
The United Kingdom carried out two offensive cyber operations. One was against
a wide range of state targets, and the other only targeted Russia. Russia is considered
stronger than the United Kingdom, which helped solidify the United Kingdom`s positive
revolutionary index score. Russia being one of the main focuses of the United Kingdom`s
cyber operations is significant because the United Kingdom seems to focus its efforts
(though a small number of operations) against a major power that is considered stronger
than itself. The United Kingdom itself is a relatively major power in the world, so it
supports the idea that states that already have power utilize cyber operations to compete
with other states with power. These cyber operations have allowed the United Kingdom
to conduct espionage against Russia but have not given the United Kingdom an equal
power to Russia. This leads to the conclusion that the cases of the United Kingdom do
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not support the assertion that offensive cyber operations are revolutionary tools of
warfare.
Vietnam targeted a variety of states with its offensive cyber operations, but
mainly regional rival states as well. This supports the idea that to date, cyber operations
have mostly been utilized in regional rivalries. These conflicts could prove that cyber
operations are revolutionary in the future if cyber operations change the balance of power
in those conflicts, however, this has not happened to date.
States With Only One Offensive Cyber Operation
There are ten states in the data set with a positive revolutionary index score on
average that have carried out only one offensive cyber operation (though not necessarily
one target of the operation): Australia, Canada, France, Lebanon, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, South Korea, Spain, Syria, and Taiwan. These states only carried out one
offensive cyber operation each, though not necessarily against one target state. If there
was only one target of the operation, then that one target was stronger than the aggressor
state. If there was more than one target state of the operation, then the average of all of
the CINC scores of the targets resulted in an average score stronger than the score of the
aggressor state.
Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand all only targeted Russia
with their one offensive cyber operation, though they were not all part of the same
operation. The Netherlands conducted its own operation against Russia, while Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand (the United Kingdom also took part in this operation)
conducted a joint operation against Russia. This is significant that the only offensive
cyber operation that these states carried out was against a stronger state, a major world
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power. These states would likely be considered middle powers, not weak, but by no
means strong. Cyber operations have allowed these states that already have some level of
power to conduct operations against a major power but have not changed the balance of
power.
France and Spain both carried out an operation against a wide range of targets of
varying levels of power, and both ended up with the average CINC score of the states of
that list being higher than their own. Neither of these cases help either support or
disprove that cyber operations are revolutionary tools, because the wide range of
strengths of the target states seems to be random, there is not a pattern. This could be a
sign that these tactics are not revolutionary because there is not a clear pattern of weaker
states conducting operations against stronger states, but the lack of a pattern in this case
does not count as evidence for or against the argument.
Lebanon carried out a single operation that targeted the United States, France,
Germany, and Canada, all more powerful than itself. This operation was for the purposes
of espionage, indicating that although it was conducted against significantly stronger
states, its purpose was not revolutionary. This instance of an offensive cyber operation
was purely a new way to conduct espionage, it was meant to be covert, and it did not help
Lebanon gain any more power.
South Korea`s one offensive cyber operation supports the idea that these tactics
are most useful against regional state rivals. The operation was conducted against China,
North Korea, Russia, Japan, and Taiwan. All of these states are geographically close to
South Korea, and all of them, except potentially Japan, are significant rivals of South
Korea. The purpose of the operation was espionage, indicating that there was no expected
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power shift from the operation. Cyber tactics have likely allowed South Korea to conduct
more espionage on those other states than it might have been able to otherwise, but this
does not mean that it is revolutionary because it does not change the distribution of power
in the region.
Both Syria and Taiwan only carried out one offensive cyber operation each, and
each of these operations targeted a major power. Syria`s was an espionage operation
against the United States, while Taiwan conducted a denial-of-service operation against
China. Syria`s espionage operation reinforces the idea that although weak states may
consider targeting strong states, if they do carry it out it will be for espionage to gain
information, not to take advantage and change the balance of power. Although Taiwan
conducted a truly offensive cyber operation against China that could qualify as
revolutionary, it occurred in 2007 and Taiwan has not carried out another offensive
operation since then. If cyber operations were truly revolutionary, these operations would
have continued and likely become more aggressive over time.
If these offensive cyber operations caused a shift in the balance of power, then
these tactics might qualify as revolutionary. However, none of the cyber operations
described in this section show evidence that the balance of power shifted as a result of
these operations. Another sign that these tactics are revolutionary would be if they were
used by these states more frequently as time progressed. The length of the list of states
that carried out less than ten cyber operations throughout the fifteen-year period itself
indicates that they are not being utilized as frequently as they should be if the tactic was
truly revolutionary. The consistent use of these operations for the purposes of espionage
indicates that they are still being used for non-cyber attack/cyber warfare purposes.
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States With Negative Revolutionary Index Scores
There were four states with negative revolutionary index scores, with a wide
range of number of operations carried out by each state, which range from one offensive
operation to one hundred eighteen operations. India and Indonesia each only carried out
one offensive operation (though not necessarily one target state), while the United States
carried out thirteen operations, and China carried out significantly more, at one hundred
eighteen operations. The high number of offensive operations carried out by China skews
the data set, but also demonstrates the conclusions of the data set, which will be discussed
going forward.
India
India only conducted one offensive cyber operation against several targets, mainly
regional rival actors. India is one of the strongest actors in the region and its CINC score
reflects that, so it was stronger than most of the targets of its operations. One of the
targets of its operation was Pakistan, its biggest rival, who is rated as weaker than India.
Cyber operations have allowed India to act against Pakistan, who they likely could not
act against conventionally without a strong, serious response. The purpose of the cyber
operation was espionage, but that could have helped India gain an advantage over
Pakistan. However, if cyber operations were truly revolutionary, there would have been
more than one instance of India using these operations against Pakistan to gain an
advantage. It is highly likely that they have used these operations against Pakistan on
other occasions, but they have not been publicly recorded if they have happened, so it is
not able to be used as evidence for this paper. As stated earlier when discussing Pakistan,
this rivalry/conflict between India and Pakistan will be a good power struggle case to
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watch moving forward for the potential for the use of offensive cyber operations in
warfare, or in lieu of warfare, in the future.
Indonesia
Indonesia conducted one recorded offensive cyber operation against one state
over the fifteen-year period examined. It conducted this offensive operation against
Australia, a state with a weaker/lower CINC score than Indonesia, giving Indonesia an
overall negative revolutionary index score. The purpose of this operation was espionage,
indicating that even though the operation was carried out against a weaker state it was
still for the purpose of espionage. This example does not support that these operations are
revolutionary, because there was only one operation carried out by Indonesia, and it did
not affect its power difference with Australia.
United States
The United States only carried out thirteen recorded offensive cyber operations
over the fifteen-year period. Most of these operations were carried out against weaker
states, because the only state with a higher CINC score than the United States is China.
The United States is only publicly listed as carrying out one cyber operation against
China, so that was the only incident with a positive revolutionary score, all other
operations ended with a negative revolutionary score, giving the United States an overall
negative revolutionary index score. Out of the thirteen offensive cyber operations, less
than half of the overall operations were for the purposes of espionage. The espionage
operations were conducted against a large number of states at once. Most of the
operations were truly offensive, using tactics such as data destruction, sabotage, and
denial-of-service.
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One of the most notorious and successful examples of an offensive cyber
operation carried out by the United States was Stuxnet. This operation used cyber means
to conduct sabotage against the Iranian nuclear program. The Stuxnet “worm” was found
in computer systems all over the world but was designed to only target a specific
industrial controller designed to run a series of nuclear centrifuges manufactured by the
company Siemens. These devices were utilized by Iran in their nuclear program that the
United States wanted to prevent. The “worm” caused the centrifuges to make tiny
adjustments to the pressure inside the centrifuges and caused the speed of the centrifuges
to speed up and slow down, breaking or exploding the centrifuges and causing damage to
the overall machine (Singer and Friedman, 116-117).
Stuxnet was one of the first, if not the first, examples of a successful offensive
cyber operation that caused physical damage and went largely undetected for a long
period of time. The Stuxnet operation could be seen as more effective than a physical
attack could have been, because it took longer to discover and fix, potentially setting back
the program for a longer period of time than if the United States had physically attacked
the Iranian nuclear facilities when the operation first began. It also allowed the United
States to deny the operation for a long period of time and made it more difficult for Iran
to retaliate. If the United States had physically attacked the Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran
could have responded aggressively with a physical attack of their own or could have had
the international community admonish the United States more thoroughly. Since this type
of operation was so new, the international community had a difficult time responding,
and Iran could merely denounce the operation, they did not (at least publicly) carry out
any operations in retaliation.
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The United States carried out two very public denial-of-service operations against
adversary states: an operation against North Korea in 2017, and a 2018 operation against
a Russian troll farm that was reported in 2019. The United States publicly announced that
they were conducting denial-of-service operations against North Korea`s General
Reconnaissance Bureau, a branch of their intelligence services. In 2018, United States
Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) began a denial-of-service operation against Russian
troll farms known for using disinformation tactics. The operation against Russia was
technically in retaliation for offensive cyber disinformation operations conducted by
Russia, so it could potentially be seen as cyber retaliation for a cyber operation. Both the
operation against North Korea and the operation against Russia were public offensive
operations carried out by one state against another, that did not cause a physical response
and neither state appeared to respond.
The United States demonstrates several different aspects to consider about
offensive cyber operations. The ways in which the United States has utilized offensive
cyber operations could be considered revolutionary because they have conducted truly
offensive operations, some of which have caused physical damage, against other states.
The Stuxnet operation was a prime example of how a cyber operation could cause
physical damage, and since this operation occurred back in 2010, it could be assumed that
in the ten years since this point, there could be cyber tactics even more advanced and
better at causing physical damage.
The public denial-of-service operations against North Korea and Russia carried
out by the United States demonstrates how states can utilize cyber operations without fear
of another state responding. They also allow the United States to compromise
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infrastructure and systems within the sovereign borders of the target state(s). This could
be seen as a violation of sovereignty of the target state, which could prompt a response.
However, as seen throughout the examples throughout the data set, there is typically not a
response stronger than denouncement, and regularly no response at all.
Despite all of the potentially revolutionary offensive cyber operations the United
States has carried out, it could be argued that because these operations were carried out
by the United States, a major power, this supports the argument that cyber operations are
not revolutionary. If the technology was truly revolutionary, this type of operation would
be used by a wide variety of states, especially states weaker than major powers. The
United States has used cyber technology to assert power over aspiring middle powers that
want to become major powers, and against lower powers as well. This supports that cyber
operations are simply another tool used by the strong powers to keep the weaker powers
in their current position, or at least to prevent them from becoming major powers. These
instances give evidence both for and against the revolutionary potential of offensive
cyber operations; however, since “revolutionary” in the sense of this paper is dependent
on which states actually use cyber operations and how they change the existing status quo
or balance of power, the evidence that the truly offensive types of cyber operations that
could be considered cyber attacks are more frequently carried out by states that are
already major powers.
China
As the state with the highest CINC score, every offensive cyber operations that
China carried out was against a state considered weaker than themselves, giving all of
their operations a negative revolutionary index score. China carried out several different
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types of cyber operations, but most of the operations it carried out were categorized as
espionage operations. Many of its operations were carried out against the United States as
well. Both the fact that many of China`s operations were likely for the purposes of
espionage and that many of the operations were carried out against the United States are
significant, but first there will be an examination of several different examples of Chinese
state-sponsored offensive cyber operations.
China was able to successfully target and penetrate the Office of Personnel
Management of the United States government. The operation was discovered in 2015, but
it is unknown or not public knowledge how long China had been in the system and what
information they had gained access to, but it is known that they gained access to the
security clearance information of tens of thousands of United States government
employees. The security clearance information in the system contained potentially
damaging personal information that the Chinese government could use to its advantage.
The ambiguity of what information China was able to gain access to, exploit, and save
increases the damage of the operation because what China is planning to do or could do
with the information is unclear (Schmidt, 2015). This is an example of China conducting
espionage against a fellow great power, indicating that offensive cyber operations might
not be revolutionary if they are consistently used by great powers against one another.
In 2009, monitors discovered that systems and computers associated with the
United States Air Force`s Joint Strike Fighter project, also known as the F-35 Lightning
II, belonging to Lockheed Martin were compromised. It has never been concretely proven
that China was behind the operation; however, the striking similarities between the F-35
and the Chinese J-20 have increased the speculation that China was behind the program
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(Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). The goal of this operation was not to destroy or set
back the program, the goal was seemingly just for espionage to gain access to the data in
order for China to advance its own military aviation program. This use of espionage
reiterates the point of the previous paragraph, that this frequent use of espionage takes
away from the revolutionary potential of offensive cyber operations because this is
simply a new form of information theft in this case, not a new form of warfare.
China has also utilized offensive cyber operations to target people groups that it
believes are illegitimate or that they clash with culturally. China conducts these
operations domestically, but these operations are outside the scope of this study. These
operations are also conducted on an international scale, against these targeted people
groups in the sovereign territory of another state, under their protection. In 2018, experts
discovered that a threat group in China had been targeting the Tibetan population in India
for the purposes of espionage (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). The Tibetan
population is a minority group that China clashes with culturally, but it has very little
power. This is an example of China devoting resources to carrying out offensive cyber
operations against a weak group of people in another state in order to gain information to
use to its advantage. This operation is another incident where a strong actor is acting
against a very weak actor/group of people, indicating that offensive cyber operations
might not be revolutionary.
The South China Sea is a major area of contention in the region for all of the
regional actors, especially China. China has gone to great lengths to assert its supremacy
in the region, and conducting offensive cyber operations is no exception. China has at
least one, likely several, threat actor groups that work against rivals and targets in the
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South China Sea. One of these threat actor groups, APT 30, was discovered in 2015, and
targeted over ten state actors in the region. This group is known for utilizing spearphishing techniques, indicating that these operations were extremely intentional and
targeted, not simply wide-net operations that happened to capture these groups as well.
These operations could indicate that offensive cyber operations are revolutionary, at least
in the sense of a regional conflict. China is able to act against its regional rivals and gain
an advantage without carrying out conventional operations.
Based on the available data in the data set, many of China`s offensive cyber
operations are conducted against the United States. This could both support and disprove
that offensive cyber operations are revolutionary. They are revolutionary in the sense that
they allow China to conduct offensive operations against the United States that help them
gain an advantage without prompting a conventional conflict. In many of the cases China
has also been able to create doubt around their involvement in the operation due to the
attribution problem, giving them somewhat of a diplomatic advantage. However, this
could also prove that these operations are not revolutionary, or at least not completely.
The United States and China are both major powers, allowing these operations to be used
as a tool in great power competitions, not weak against strong powers. Many of China`s
operations, against the United States and any of its other targets, are also for the purposes
of espionage.

Overall Revolutionary Index Data Set Conclusions
The available data that was analyzed in this chapter overall indicates that
offensive cyber operations are not revolutionary, at least not in most senses of the term.
The necessary condition established for them to be considered revolutionary required that
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most cases should be weaker states carrying out operations against stronger states. While
there are a greater number of states that on average carried out operations against states
stronger than themselves, the overall number of weaker versus stronger state incidents is
lower than the number of stronger versus weaker cases. However, it is not just a matter of
stronger versus weaker, there are more nuances that need to be discussed.
Although statistics on the number of states that on average carried out operations
against states stronger than themselves and the overall number of operations carried out
by weak states against strong nations seem to be at odds with one another, there could be
an explanation. The patterns and statistics seem to indicate that the states that utilize
offensive cyber operations the most frequently, and potentially the most effectively, are
states that are great powers or aspiring great powers. The states generally start out with a
certain level of power, there are not cases in the data set of states with little to no power
carrying out these operations.
Offensive cyber operations are a way for states that fall into categories of great
powers, aspiring great powers, or medium powers to attempt to gain power, or at least an
advantage. The main aggressors that on average carried out more offensive cyber
operations against stronger states than against weaker states are all aspiring powers.
Russia, Iran, and North Korea are all aspiring powers with a level of power already.
Though all three of these states have different levels of power, they all aspire to compete
on the highest level, against the United States and possibly China, and these operations
seem to all them to compete with them in some ways. They utilize these operations to
stay relevant as a competitor to other powers and to gain information. However, these
operations have not truly changed their power status or taken them past great powers.
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In many of the cases of cyber operations in this data set, the operations were used
for the purposes of espionage. This does not support the idea that they are revolutionary.
Though espionage can give states an advantage, it usually does not change the power
balance between the states. The cases seem to indicate that cyber operations are simply a
new tool of espionage, not a new tool of warfare. There are claims that offensive cyber
operations could be used to shut down power grids and paralyze countries by destroying
their means of communication, but these types of operations have not actually occurred to
date. There have been denial-of-service incidents that have shut down companies or
sectors (such as the Estonian case in 2007), but they have not been to the scale that
people have predicted.
In order for offensive cyber operations to be considered truly revolutionary, they
need to have actually changed the balance of power or the power dynamic of the world,
or at least the states involved. Nuclear weapons are possessed by very few states, but the
states that do possess the capability have a certain guarantee of security and level of
power. North Korea has nuclear weapons, and they help guarantee its sovereignty to a
level that could not be done otherwise. Cyber capabilities do not provide this benefit, and
although they can be used in conflict, they do not change the balance of power.
Cyber operations could be seen as revolutionary in the sense that they give
aspiring powers a new tool to use against strong powers. However, they could also be
seen as not revolutionary since they do not empower weak states and have not caused a
shift in the balance of power. The use of these operations as primarily a tool of espionage
does not support that these operations are revolutionary either. Though offensive cyber
operations might not be truly revolutionary now, it does not mean that they will never be.
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The field is still growing quickly, and states are working to develop their capabilities, and
the field will continue to evolve.
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Chapter Five
Revolutionary Capabilities Data Set Results

After the revolutionary index data was examined, there was a need for further
study of what could cause these types of results. Specifically, it is important to examine
why some states conduct attacks, some conduct more than others, and other, capable
states have conducted no attacks at all. In other words, the following offers an initial
statistical examination of which variables affect the propensity of a state to use offensive
cyber operations. The Code Book for this data set can be found in Chapter Three. The
dependent variable for this analysis was whether or not a state carried out an offensive
cyber operation recorded in the Council on Foreign Relations data base from 2005-2019.
The four independent variables were: level of democracy (Freedom House
scores); economic power (GDP per capita of each state in US dollars); military power
(military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP); and overall state power (Correlates of
War Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score). More information about
the CINC score is available in chapter three.
The hypotheses based on these variables are as follows:
H1: The higher the level of state power, the more likely that state is to carry out an
offensive cyber operation.
H2: The higher the level of military power a state has, the more likely that state is to
carry out an offensive cyber operation.
H3: The higher the level of economic power a state has, the more likely that state is to
carry out an offensive cyber operation.
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H4: The lower the level of democracy of a state, the more likely that state is to carry out
an offensive cyber operation.
After loading the data set into R, the variables were vetted. The data is appropriate
for statistical analysis and shows signs of convergence. There are some outliers with
some of the variables; however, this is expected when dealing with such a wide range of
states. The Freedom House variable showed good signs of convergence with no outliers.
It shows no signs of overdispersion with a range of 0 to 2 and a standard deviation of .86.
The mean is 1.1, the median is 1, and the mode is 2. The GDP per capita variable showed
good signs of convergence with only one outlier. The variable shows no signs of
overdispersion with a range of $1,098 to $97,341 and a standard deviation of $21,576.26.
It has a mean of $25,552, a median of $18,233, and a mode of $49,854.
The CINC score variable showed decent signs of convergence, with eight outliers.
These outliers are acceptable because there can be a wide range of state strength within
the data set. It shows no signs of overdispersion with a range of 0.000038 to 0.218117
and a standard deviation of .03. The variable has a mean of .01 and a median and mode of
0. The percentage of GDP spent on the military variable showed decent signs of
convergence with seven outliers. These outliers are acceptable because some states do
spend a much larger percentage of their GDP on their military. The variable shows no
signs of overdispersion with a range of 0.2% to 24% with a standard deviation of 3.38. It
has a mean of 2.65%, a median of 1.8%, and a mode of .7%.
Each of the 107 cases examined are a state that met the threshold for theoretically
being able to carry out an offensive cyber operation. This threshold is based on the state`s
military technology listed in the Central Intelligence Agency`s World Factbook, and if
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the technology listed there requires advanced cyber capabilities to operate, then the state
is considered capable of conducting an offensive cyber operation. All 107 of the cases
represent states that are capable of conducting offensive cyber operations. Whether or not
a state carries out an offensive cyber operation is the dependent variable, scored either 0
for no cyber operation, or 1 for having carried out an offensive cyber operation. For
example, one of the cases/data points is China. It has a score of 1 for the dependent
variable because it has carried out offensive cyber operations. It has a score of 0 for the
Freedom House score because it was rated as not free, and a CINC score of 0.218117.
China has a GDP per capita of $16,117 and spends 1.9% of its GDP on the military. All
of these points together make up a case.
These relationships between each of the four independent variables and the
dependent variable were tested using a logit regression. A logit regression was utilized
because the dependent variable is tracked with zeroes and ones, so a linear regression
could not be used. There is very limited publicly available information on offensive cyber
operations that have been conducted, even those conducted by state actors. If more
information on these incidents, such as the length of time of the operation, the level of
damage of the operations, and the response by the target state, was available, then a linear
regression could be conducted. Conducting a logit analysis is acceptable because there
are over 100 cases in the data set.
There are several key limitations associated with the use of a logit model. Due to
the binary way in which the dependent variable is measured, with 0s and 1s to represent
whether or not a state ever carried out an offensive cyber operation, the scope and
frequency of the operations are lost. This data set does not discriminate between one state
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that carried out one operation that had no effect on another state, and one state that
carried out hundreds of operations against other states, some of which were debilitating
for the target state. For example, Indonesia was given a score of 1, even though it only
carried out one operation against Australia for surveillance, which did not have any major
effects on Australia (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). China was also given a score
of 1, but it conducted 118 offensive cyber operations and some of them were debilitating
or very damaging for the target, such as when they conducted operations against the
United States Office of Personnel Management and gained access to the extensive
records of millions of government employees, endangering national security (Council on
Foreign Relations, 2020). Both of these states are given the same score utilizing the logit
function, which does not at all account for the differences between the two.
When analyzing the logit results, it cannot account for which of the variables have
the biggest impact due to logit limitations. In a linear regression the coefficient signifies
the strength of the relationship, but it does not in a logit. All that can be solidly
determined from the results of the logit analysis is based on the z-value, showing the
precision and demonstrating which variables have a real relationship (whether positive or
negative). Due to this issue, the coefficient does not indicate how the dependent variables
increase or decrease with each change in the independent variable, which makes the
results easier to analyze.
The data was analyzed utilizing the R computer program to conduct a logit
regression. The threshold for the z-value and confidence level to be considered dependent
on each other is 1.96. Only one of the variables crossed this threshold. The following
table lists the results of the regression, then the results will be discussed.
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Logit Results for Analysis of Determinants of Offensive Cyber Operations
Estimate
Standard Error z value
Pr(>|z| )
(Intercept)
-3.859
0.8619
-4.478
0.00000755
Freedom House 0.4256
0.4264
0.998
0.31825
GDP per Capita 0.00001783
0.0000143
1.241
0.21448
CINC Score
128.1
40.7
3.141
0.00168
Military
0.1482
0.0791
1.873
0.06106
Spending

The Freedom House independent variable has neither a precise nor strong
relationship with the dependent variable. It has a z-value of 0.988 and a coefficient of
0.426. This indicates that there is not a discernable relationship between the level of
democracy and whether or not a state carries out offensive cyber operations. This is both
expected and unexpected. A wide variety of states carry out offensive cyber operations,
so it is not surprising that there is not a discernable pattern. Democratic states might use
these tactics because their populations will not support conventional offensive operations
against another state to spark an armed conflict, they do not respond as positively to these
actions. Less democratic states might use these tactics because they are able to exploit the
systems and societies of states with more freedoms to their advantage. The lack of a
relationship between the level of democracy of a state and whether or not it chooses to
carry out offensive cyber operations will not help people predict what states are more
likely to use these tactics. These results do not support Hypothesis 4.
The economic power independent variable that is measured by the GDP per capita
of each state has neither a precise nor a strong relationship with the dependent variable. It
has a z-value of 1.241 and a coefficient of 0.00001783. This disproves Hypothesis 3,
which stated that the more economic power a state has, the more likely it would be to
carry out an offensive cyber operation. While the z-value does not meet the standard, this
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economic power variable has a more precise and strong relationship with the dependent
variable than the level of democracy. An economically powerful state might use
offensive cyber operations to advance their economic standing further. An economically
weak state might use offensive cyber operations to advance its economic standing by
stealing intellectual property or proprietary information from another state. Economically
weak states might have been more likely to carry out offensive cyber operations because
they are cheaper than other methods to gain power and do not cost a large amount of
money. Since both economically strong and economically weak states have the
motivation, and likely the means, to carry out these operations, the lack of a strong
relationship could be expected.
The military power independent variable that is measured by the percentage of the
GDP spent on the military by each state is not strong and does not meet the 1.96
threshold for precision, but it is very close, with a z-value of 1.873. It has a coefficient of
0.1482. Although the z-value of 1.873 does not reach the threshold of 1.96, it crosses the
90% threshold so it can be considered to have a significant relationship with the
dependent variable. It could be a determining or predictive factor of which states will
carry out offensive cyber operations. Since this variable reaches the 90% threshold, it
qualifies as significant (though less so than if it crossed the 1.96 threshold), it supports
the findings of the previous chapter that the stronger states (who would be strong
militarily) are more likely to carry out more offensive cyber operations. Hypothesis 2 was
partly supported suggesting an avenue for future research.
The overall level of power, measured by the Correlates of War Composite Index
of National Capabilities (CINC) score, was the only independent variable that crossed the
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1.96 threshold. This independent variable has a z-value of 3.141 and a coefficient of
128.1. This indicates that there is a high level of precision between the overall level of
power and whether or not a state carries out offensive cyber operations. The relationship
is positive, indicating that the stronger a state is, the more likely that state is to carry out
an offensive cyber operation. This would support the results of the previous chapter for a
number of reasons. This independent variable utilized the same metric as the
revolutionary index capabilities data set. The results of the regression of this independent
variable with the dependent variable support the idea of the revolutionary capabilities
data set because both indicate that the stronger a state is, the more likely it is to carry out
offensive cyber operations. The z-value of 3.141 is significantly higher than 1.96,
indicating that this relationship is statistically significant.
Based on the two independent variables that have a significant relationship with
the dependent variable, five different models were estimated to determine the likelihood
that a nation would carry out an offensive cyber operation. Since the CINC score and
percentage of GDP spent on the military were the two variables that had relationships
with whether or not a nation carried out an offensive cyber operation, they were each
varied by half of a standard deviation and one standard deviation in order to determine
predictive values. The following table presents the probabilities determined for each
variation of the independent variables:
Probability Table
Average
+1/2 standard deviation of CINC score
+1 standard deviation of CINC score
+1/2 standard deviation of military
+1 standard deviation of military
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10.1%
43.4%
84%
12.6%
15.6%

These results demonstrate that the CINC score variable has a much greater effect
on the dependent variable than the military expenditure variable. This supports that for
each increase in overall nation power, the probability that the nation will carry out an
offensive cyber operation increases significantly. An increase in military expenditure
could also relate to an increase in the likelihood that a nation will conduct an offensive
cyber operation, but the relationship does not appear to be as closely linked as overall
nation power.
The results of this data set indicate that the level of democracy and economic
power do not have an effect on whether or not a state carries out offensive cyber
operations. While military power does not quite meet the threshold, it is close enough to
the 1.96 threshold to be worthy of consideration in future studies. The only variable that
unambiguously achieves statistical significance is overall state power.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to determine if offensive cyber operations are
revolutionary tools of warfare. There is a significant amount of future research to be
conducted in this area, but this study provides a starting point. It began by analyzing the
existing data base of offensive cyber operations compiled by the Council on Foreign
Relations in the Revolutionary Index Data Set. Based on this data set, offensive cyber
operations are not revolutionary tools of warfare because (based on publicly available
data) the states that carry out most of the offensive cyber operations are already strong
states, or at least states that have some level of world standing already.
While this data could also cause offensive cyber operations to be considered
revolutionary in the sense that states were still conducting operations against states
stronger than themselves, most of these states already had some level of power. This
indicates that it is a tool used by great powers, or aspiring great powers, to gain or
maintain power, which does not make it revolutionary. The main states that conducted
offensive cyber operations were China, the United States, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
All of these states are either great powers or aspiring great powers. If many states that
have little or no power conducted a large number of operations or even just a few
operations against major powers, then these operations might be considered
revolutionary. However, this is not the case, so these operations are not revolutionary.
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After this data set was examined, it led to the need for further examination of the
factors that might have caused the results of the Revolutionary Index Data Set, which
lead to the Revolutionary Capabilities Data Set. This examined the effects of four
different variables on whether or not a state chooses to carry out offensive cyber
operations: level of democracy, economic power, military power, and overall state power.
The results of the Revolutionary Capabilities Data Set indicate that out of these four
variables, only overall state power is correlated with whether or not a nation chooses to
carry out offensive cyber operations. Military power comes close to the threshold to be
considered a significant and relevant factor, but only overall state power crosses the
threshold. The relationship between the overall state power and whether or not a state
carries out offensive cyber operations is positive, indicating that the more power a state
has, the more likely it is to carry out on offensive cyber operation.
Overall state power meeting the requirements to be considered a relevant and
significant factor fits in with the results of the Revolutionary Index Data Set as well. The
overall state power variable was measured with the same data/measure as the
Revolutionary Index Data Set: the CINC score from the Correlates of War database. This
also demonstrates that the results of the Revolutionary Capabilities Data Set match the
results of the Revolutionary Index Data Set. The stronger a state is, the more likely that
state is to carry out an offensive cyber operation.
If stronger states are more likely to carry out offensive cyber operations, this
means that offensive cyber operations are not revolutionary tools of warfare. If weaker
states were more likely to carry out offensive cyber operations or were at least as likely as
stronger states, then this would meet the necessary condition for cyber attacks to be
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considered revolutionary. However, since this is not the case, these operations cannot be
deemed reovlutionary. Further study of this topic could yield different results but based
on the parameters and scope of this study, offensive cyber operations cannot be
considered revolutionary.
Through these two data sets, this study demonstrated that offensive cyber
operations are not equalizing tools utilized by smaller and weaker states, at least not to a
level worth noting. They are utilized by some relatively weaker states, but rarely and not
by any truly weak states. For example, the data sets did not demonstrate instances of
African or South American states utilizing these operations against one another, or
against major world powers such as the United States and China. These types of
operations would indicate a revolutionary capability, but there was no evidence of them
in the available data.
This will serve as a starting point to help guide future research on which states or
types of states conduct offensive cyber operations. The field of cyber operations will
continue to evolve over time, likely quickly. As more data becomes available, this study
and studies like this will be able to be carried out more accurately and with better data.
Even though this study has concluded that offensive cyber operations are not
revolutionary, this does not mean that these operations will not be revolutionary in the
future. As more states gain more capabilities, and more extensive capabilities, they might
be more likely to conduct offensive cyber operations to gain more power. It is also
possible that cyber operations will become normal and expected tools in conflicts. There
are many possibilities for the future of offensive cyber operations and the study of them,
this study is only portion of the beginning of the area.
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Appendix
Numbers of Offensive Cyber Operations by State
Australia
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

Canada
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.032781

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.030924

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

China

France

92

1
3
6
5
3
4
9
5
9
14
11
5
6
17
20
118
-0.145177

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.023427

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

India

Indonesia
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
-0.040029

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
-0.007149

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

Iran

Israel

94

0
0
0
0
0
3
0
4
1
5
4
2
5
4
8
36
0.050532

0
0
1
0
0
1
1
2
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
7
0.009568

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

Lebanon

Netherlands
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

95

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0.044187

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0.035942

New Zealand

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.039217

North Korea
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
2
1
2
3
4
6
6
27
0.045054
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2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

Pakistan

Russia

97

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
4
0.062580

0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
4
6
9
9
15
20
8
75
0.006260

South Korea

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

Spain

98

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.053549

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.011283

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

Syria

Taiwan

99

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.134512

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.178149

United Arab Emirates

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
2
0.000951

United Kingdom
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
0.012904
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United States

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total Number of Offensive Operations
Average Revolutionary Index Score

Vietnam
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0
0
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
1
2
0
4
13
-0.106330

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
1
4
0.071101

State Cases in the Revolutionary Capabilities Data Set
Afghanistan
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gabon
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland

Kenya
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Libya
Lithuania
Malaysia
Mexico
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Myanmar
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Serbia
Singapore
Slovak Republic
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
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India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan

United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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